study of energy policy and the possibility of creating new energy projects, analysis of priority areas of cooperation in the context of globalization, ensuring reliable distribution and protection of energy resources.
Goals. The purpose of this article is to analyze the prospects for the development of energy integration on the Eurasian space together with the EU and the SREB.
In accordance with the goal, the priorities of the development of integration cooperation in the energy sector in the context of the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, taking into ac- count the changes in the nature of modern global and regional processes to create a qualitatively new level of economic partnership, are not sufficiently analyzed. Energy cooperation between the EAEU, the EU and the SREB countries mainly has a bilateral format of cooperation, which does not contribute to the trilateral integration (between three integration associations) in the energy sector.
Methods. To identify a number of challenges and opportunities for the connecting EAEU-EU- SREB, it is necessary to look at the connecting and interests of its participants from the point of view of different approaches: structural (structural realism), foreign policy (constructivism) and institutional (functionalism and neo-functionalism). This article uses a complex analysis based on a combination of system analysis, empirical research, institutional and structural analysis. These General methods made it possible to comprehensively consider the problem of energy policy in the changing system of international relations. The study also used the method of comparative analysis and prognostic method to determine the prospects for the development of trilateral en- ergy cooperation. The use of systematic and structural-functional analysis allowed drawing con- clusions about the priority areas of cooperation and interests of regional entities. Thus, structural approaches suggest that the EAEU-EU-SREB interface is beneficial to its potential participants, if not directly, then at least indirectly in terms of alternative costs. For Russia and China, it is not only economic cooperation, but also the avoidance of political competition in the region. For the countries of Eurasia is the possibility of a balanced reliance on two centers of power. For the EU are new sources of energy resources. In other words, there is an informal consensus on the strate- gic feasibility of cooperation rather than competition in the region. On the other hand, in addition to informal consent, there are tactical contradictions. The constructivist approach shows that the interface is of the greatest interest for the SREB. At the same time, the views and approaches of partners to mating differ, which hinders the integration process.
Results / discussion China in Eurasia: updating priorities
In the middle of the second decade of the XXI century in China the integration of the domestic market is mainly completed and modern infrastructure is built. Modernization based on industri- alization seems to be coming to an end [1]. The consumer and environmental revolutions unfolded in full force, the energy intensity of production and life is decreasing at an unprecedented rate, destroying the usual ways of management and overturning numerous forecasts of the economy and energy [2]. Gradually, relations with neighbors are also changing, to whom new prospects for joint development of Eurasia have been proposed within the framework of the “One belt One road” program.
Completion of modernization in China occurred in a stable mode. The slowdown in growth at the end of the period is recognized as a natural phenomenon, and the main attention of society is now focused on new areas.
China seriously needs oil to supply raw materials to their refineries (refinery). It should be not- ed that in 2018 China’s own oil production decreased by 1.3% compared to 2017 and amounted to 189.11 million tons [3]. Despite state support, China’s oil production has been declining for the third year in a row. At the same time, oil refining is growing against the backdrop of declining production. In 2018, it exceeded the previous year’s figures by 12.1 million tons and reached a record 603.6 million tons (+2%) [4]. The Chinese state-owned company CNPC predicts that in
increase to 634 million tons [5]. Due to rising production costs and lower world oil prices, China has become more profitable to import this energy.
Given the growing imbalance between gas production and consumption, China has completed the opening of four main energy corridors: North-East, North-West, South-East and South-West.
The entire gas transportation system of China is focused on gas flows from Eurasia region (North-Western corridor).
In the context of China’s growing dependence on oil and gas, the most important direction of its foreign energy policy was the diversification of imports. After the Arab spring the traditional ways of delivering oil and gas from the Middle East have become increasingly dangerous and unstable. In these conditions, the role of land energy corridors is increasing. One of the priority directions is the development of continental supplies of oil and gas raw materials from EAEU by pipeline transport.
China’s policy in Eurasia is systemic, large-scale and long-term, pursuing both current com- mercial and strategic goals.
The attractiveness of Eurasia for China is determined by several factors. First, it is a mutual interest. Eurasian countries need investment to develop their oil and gas resources and markets, and China needs to diversify its energy sources. Secondly, the presence of common borders af- fects, which makes it possible to transport oil and gas resources without intermediaries. Thirdly, communication with the EAEU supporting the program development of the North-West of China.
This provides new jobs in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which should, in China’s view, contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the area. Fourthly, ensuring a peaceful environ- ment and expanding influence on the Eurasian countries is achieved, which is important from the perspective of the geopolitical goals of Beijing [6].
The revival of the cooperation between the EU and the EAEU in the energy sector.
Today, the most ambitious regional integration process is the European Union. At the same time, the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, established in 2010 with its sub- sequent transformation into the Eurasian economic Union (EAEU), consisting of five States, is an important example of regional economic integration in Northern and Central Eurasia [7]. The potential interaction between the two integration associations that emerged on the Eurasian conti- nent opens up broad opportunities for accelerating the economic development of the participating countries.
As for cooperation between the EU and the EAEU in the energy sector, it is important to understand that in the near future the Eurasian continent will account for more than half of the world’s electricity demand, which means that it will have a significant impact on the development of world energy.
It is expected that, despite disagreements on some issues, the EU position in the energy sec- tor will be more cohesive and unified. The European Union’s strategy for a sustainable energy Union is an example. It is a document aimed at diversifying the sources, suppliers and routes of gas supplies to the EU. This is a serious impact on the EAEU, where energy companies occupy a prominent place in the economy and provide a significant share of export revenues. In addition, demand for electricity is likely to decline, not least due to energy efficiency and climate change.
At the same time, the Eurasian economic Union plans to harmonize and liberalize the electric- ity market. According to the latest decisions of the Eurasian economic Commission, work on the creation of a single electricity market in the EAEU should be completed by 2019, and work on the creation of a single oil and gas market — by 2025 [8].
The development of common electricity markets will increase trade in electricity, a commod-
al and subregional common markets can be created in the process of developing infrastructure for electricity generation and transmission. Potential key partners of the countries of Northern and Central Eurasia in the creation of such markets are the EU, China, India and Iran.
The Director of the EEC energy Department Leonid Shenets noted that first of all energy effi- ciency, energy saving and renewable energy sources are the main directions of the dialogue with the European energy community. According to Gregory Rapota, major energy and other projects may be in demand for the development of cooperation between the two major integration asso- ciations - the European Union and the Eurasian economic Union. “We are talking about projects of inter-bloc cooperation, because on a bilateral basis the EU can implement with individual countries of the EAEU. The EAEU countries are a geographical bridge between East and West.
But for various reasons, this trade and economic bridge is not working effectively yet,” explained Gregory Rapota. Another good option for cooperation between the two unions, according to the Secretary of state of the Union state, can be a new silk road economic belt initiated by the Chinese side [9].
Cooperation with European partners is very difficult because of the specific relations between the EU and Russia. Russian companies are often discriminated against in the implementation of their projects. Thus, the attempts of Russian partners to invest in the development of the Swedish port of Forsund on the island of Gotland were met with rejection and criticism, as they were per- ceived as a threat to national security [10].
An even more striking example is the situation with the largest Russian project – the Nord stream-2 gas pipeline, which is aimed at ensuring reliable gas supplies to the EU. This is par- ticularly important for the European Union in connection with the policy of improving the en- vironmental performance of European production. However, this project regularly faces serious pressure from the EU, the European Commission and the United States.
On the other hand, the European Commission has taken an unprecedented step, for the first time in the history of the EU requesting the EU mandate to negotiate with Russia on the gas pipeline.
The tough position of Germany and the negative reaction of the legal service of the EU Council to the issuance of such a mandate have so far blocked the possibility of the European Commission to delay the construction of the Nord stream – 2. But it was possible with great difficulty.
The current very difficult relations between Russia and the European Union do not contribute to the integration of integrations (closer integration between regional integration associations).
However, for the academic community, the current situation is a signal to the development of evidence-based recommendations that could turn the relationship of the parties in a constructive direction.
The energy dialogue should retain its role (along with cross-border cooperation) as an instru- ment of rapprochement between Russia and the EU. At the level of the EAEU, the dialogue has not yet been established, especially since the EU’s participation in it is not visible; however, due to a large number of problems, the topic is promising and can become a guarantee of cooperation.
Conclusion. It can be concluded that this initiative is weak. First, the format of energy dia- logue between the EAEU-EU-SREB, although it looks logical, it raises questions from the point of view of efficiency. Today, the competence of the EAEU is limited only by trade and technical regulations. Thus, outside the framework of the dialogue, there are two important components:
investment and transport. Negotiations in these areas continue on a bilateral basis. Secondly, due to the youth of the Union and the dominance of the interstate rather than supranational component in it, the coordination of interests in it occurs irregularly and in the vast majority of cases-only at the highest level. For example, in the EU, a special institution, the Committee of permanent repre- sentatives, was established for this purpose. It coordinates the process of negotiations between the relevant ministries and agencies of the EU member States and prepares proposals for the Coun- cil of Ministers on certain decisions or legislative initiatives. Without such practices, the EAEU
of the EAEU and SREB road map. Third, the deepening of integration, even under the pretext of integration, can cause opposition from the elites of the Eurasian integration participants, especial- ly in the case of instability of their domestic political environment, which cannot be completely ruled out. Finally, fourthly, the connecting EEU-EU-SREB is partly a functionalist approach (with elements of neo-functionalism at the EEU level) to prevent political and especially military rivalry in Central Asia. This means that the starting point for a single stable region is trade and economic cooperation. However, the search for the right model of such cooperation should be based not only on the functional and neo-functional approach to its implementation, but also take into account the motivation and capabilities of regional associations. Without sufficient internal and external incentives, interaction between the EAEU, the EU and the SREB cannot have the desired result.
It should not be forgotten that different views and approaches of the partners to the interface can hinder the process of energy integration. In general, it can be concluded that the transition to larger Eurasian projects can play a positive role in turning the Eurasian space into a zone of stability and cooperation. Nevertheless, at this stage it is necessary to establish a dialogue with all the countries of the regions, in particular with the regional centers – the EU, EAEU and Beijing. After that the development of cooperation and deep integration of energy projects will be possible.
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Г.А. Мовкебаева, Ж.Т. Бимагамбетова, А.К. Тогузбаева, Д.А. Юрлова Казахский национальный университет им.аль-Фараби, Алматы, Казахстан
Сопряжение ЕС-ЕАЭС-ЭПШП: интересы акторов в развитии энергетической политики на евразийском пространстве
Аннотация. Сейчас на фоне глобализации разворачиваются все важнейшие процессы современности, в том числе масштабное потребление энергоресурсов и сокращение их запасов, что приводит к росту все большего числа стран, не обеспеченных собственными энергоресурсами. В связи с этим актульными становятся вопросы энергетической интеграции и тесного сотрудничества интеграционных объединений в энергетической сфере. В статье поднимается вопрос об интересах интеграционных объединений в Евразийском регионе и выявленных ими направлениях совместного развития в контексте энергетического сотрудничества. Сделаны выводы по приоритетным направлениям развития энергетической политики и даны рекомендации по дальнейшему сотрудничеству.
Ключевые слова: Евразийский экономический союз, Европейский союз, энергетическая политика, энергетическая интеграция, Экономический пояс Шелкового пути.
Г.А. Мовкебаева, Ж.Т. Бимагамбетова, А.К.Тогузбаева, Д.А. Юрлова әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы, Қазақстан
ЕО-ЕАЭС-СРЭБ: Еуразиялық кеңістіктегі энергетикалық саясатты дамытудағы акторлар мүдделері
Аңдатпа. Қазіргі таңда жаһандану аясында заманның барлық маңызды үдерістері даму үрдісінде, оның ішінде энергия ресурстарын ауқымды тұтыну олардың қорларының қысқаруына, өз энергоресурстарымен қамтылмаған елдердің санының өсуіне себеп болуда. Осыған байланысты энергетикалық салада интергациялық бірлестіктердің тығыз ынтымақтастығы және энергетикалық интергация мәселелері өзекті болуда. Мақалада Еуразиялық аумақтағы интеграциялық бірлестіктердің мүдделері және олармен анықталған энергетикалық ынтымақтастық контекстіндегі өзара даму бағыты туралы мәселелер қарастырылды. Энергетикалық саясатты дамытудың басым бағыттары бойынша тұжырым жасалынып және алдағы ынтымақтастық бойынша ұсыныстар берілді.
Түйін сөздер: Еуразиялық экономикалық одақ, Еуропалық одақ, энергетикалық саясат, энергетикалық интеграция, Жібек жолының экономикалық белдеуі
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Статья выполнена в рамках грантового финансирования научных исследований на 2018-2020 гг. Комитета науки Министерства образования и науки Республики Казахстан (№АР05135081 «Проблемы энергетической безопасности и формирование энергетической политики в ЕАЭС»)
Сведения об авторах :
Мовкебаева Г.А. – д.и.н., профессор кафедры международных отношений и мировой экономики, директор Центра евразийских исследований, Казахский национальный университет аль-Фараби, Алматы, Казахстан.
Бимагамбетова Ж.Т. – к.ф.н., и.о. доцента кафедры дипломатического перевода, Казахский национальный университет аль-Фараби, Алматы, Казахстан.
Тогузбаева А.К.– докторант 1 курса специальности «Международные отношения» Казахского национального университета им. аль-Фараби, Алматы Казахстан.
Юрлова Д.А. – магистрант 1 курса специальности «Регионоведение» Казахского национального университета им. аль-Фараби, Алматы, Казахстан.
Movkebayeva G.A. – Doctor of History, Professor of Department of International Relations and World Economy, Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Bimagambetova Zh.T. – Candidate of Philology, Acting Associate Professor of the Department of Diplomatic Translation, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Kazakhstan, Almaty.
Toguzbayeva A.K. – PhD of «International relations», Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Yurlova D.A. – MA degree Student of «Regional Studies», Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Вестник Евразийского национального университета им. Л.Н. Гумилева. Серия Политические науки. Регионоведение. Востоковедение. Тюркология, № 2 (127)/2019, с. 93-98
http://bulpolit.enu.kz/; E-mail: [email protected] МРНТИ 11.25. 31
1А.С. Шенин, 2А.Н. Оспанова, 3Е.А. Изтелеуова
Евразийский национальный университет им. Л.Н.Гумилева, Нур-Султан, Казахстан ( E-mail: 1[email protected], 2[email protected], 2[email protected])
США в Афганистане: неясные перспективы и отсутствие консенсуса внутри американского истеблишмента
Аннотация. В рамках данной статьи авторы исследуют полярность взглядов внутри американского политического истеблишмента на проблему участия США в войне в Афганистане. Каждая из групп интересов имеет свой собственный взгляд на будущее военной кампании, предлагая различные решения для установления диалога с Талибаном, увеличения группировки американских войск и роли региональных держав – Китая, России, Индии и даже Ирана - во внутренних проблемах Афганистана. Также некоторые из этих групп предлагают обратить внимание на отдельные страны Центральной Азии, которые можно привлечь в качестве посредника к переговорам между правительством Афганистана и Талибаном.
Ключевые слова: Казахстан, США, Афганистан, Талибан, группы интересов, медиация.
https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-6887/2019-127-2-93-98 В январе 2017 г. командующий ВС США и НАТО в Афганистане генерал Джон Николсон открыто назвал сложившуюся ситуацию «тупиком». Полгода спустя президент Дональд Трамп предложил новую стратегию по разрешению проблемы, которая базируется на трех пунктах.
Первое направление включало в себя применение комплексного подхода из военных, дипломатических и экономических мер для улучшения ситуации в Афганистане. Под военными понимается направление дополнительных 4-5 тысяч американских солдат для тренировки и координации действий афганских военных на поле боя, а также более активное применение боевой авиации в борьбе с Талибаном и другими террористическими группировками (в январе-феврале 2018 г. США начали перевод войска в Афганистан из Ирака). Экономические меры заключаются в продолжении оказания экономической помощи афганскому правительству, но уже с жесткой привязкой к успехам местных чиновников в деле проведения необходимых реформ [6]. В рамках же дипломатических мер США планировали содействовать мирным переговорам между Талибаном и официальным Кабулом, правда, здесь изначально было обнаружено явное противоречие – офис госсекретаря США Рекса Тиллерсона, который подчеркнул в официальном пресс-релизе, что США поддерживают мирные переговоры без каких-либо предварительных условий, в то время как Трамп во время выступления обратил внимание слушателей, что диалог с талибами возможен только после успешных военных действий [7].
Второе направление предполагает полный отказ от какой-либо конкретной даты ухода США из Афганистана. «Враги Америки не должны знать наши планы или надеяться, что могут просто подождать, пока мы уйдем», – заявил Трамп, почеркнув, что вместо этого новый подход будет отталкиваться от конкретной ситуации в Афганистане [6]. Какой конкретно должна быть ситуация для того, чтобы американские солдаты могли вернуться домой, президент не раскрыл, однако позднее генерал Николсон и вице-президент США М. Пенс в своих выступлениях объяснили, что ключевым критерием будет способность