Journal and vol/article ref: JSP 1000062
Number of pages (not including this page): 26
Please reply to these questions on the relevant page of the proof; please do not write on this page.
Q1: Should the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2008/09) appear in the references?
Q2: The following reference was not referred to in the text: Lo 2009?
doi:10.1017/S0047279410000620
Tackling Racism in Northern Ireland:
1
‘The Race Hate Capital of Europe’
2
COLI N K N OX∗ 3
∗School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, University of Ulster, Shore Road, 4
Jordanstown, BT 37 OQB 5
email: [email protected] 6
Abstract 7
Northern Ireland has been dubbed by the media as the ‘race hate capital of Europe’ and 8
attracted recent international criticism after one hundred Roma families were forced to flee 9
their homes following racist attacks. This paper examines the problem of racism in Northern 10
Ireland from a number of perspectives. First, it considers the effectiveness of the Government’s 11
response to racism against itsRacial Equality Strategy 2005–10 using performance criteria 12
designed to track the implementation of the strategy. Second, it considers and empirically tests 13
the assertion in the literature that sectarianism shapes the way in which racism is reproduced 14
and experienced. Third, it explores racism at the level of the individual – which factors influence 15
people in Northern Ireland to exhibit racist behaviour. Finally, the paper considers the likely 16
policy implications of the research findings in the context of devolved government where 17
addressing racism is part of a wider political imbroglio which has gridlocked decision-making 18
within the power-sharing Executive of Northern Ireland.
19
Introduction and background 20
Martin McGuinness, Sinn F´ein’s deputy First Minister in the power-sharing 21
Executive in Northern Ireland, recently argued that Ireland is affected by three 22
great evils: sectarianism, racism and partitionism. While the issue of partitionism 23
is central to Sinn F´ein’s political ideology, it is racism in Northern Ireland 24
which has from2003/04attracted censorious media attention both locally and 25
internationally. At that time there were vicious attacks against the Chinese 26
community living in Belfast, the largest settled minority ethnic group. This 27
earned Northern Ireland the unenviable title of ‘race hate capital of Europe’, a 28
place which had no appeal for migrants during the years of political turmoil but 29
now appears unable to cope with multiculturalism, a situation reminiscent of 30
Britain in the1950s (Chrisafis,2004:1). Police investigating these racist attacks 31
linked them to two paramilitary groups: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 32
and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).
33
The absence of far-right politics in Northern Ireland offered a mistaken 34
perception that migrants could expect a tolerant and welcoming society. Such 35
was the conviction that racism did not present as a problem, that the legislative 36
framework equivalent to the1976Race Relations Act in Britain was not introduced 37
into Northern Ireland until the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order1997, 38
over20years later. Rolston (2004), however, claims that loyalists have had a long- 39
standing, on-off relationship with facist groups in Britain for over three decades, 40
and predicted the rise in racism in Northern Ireland. He argued 41
it would be wrong to believe that there were parts of Northern Ireland that are not and never 42
could be guilty of racism. . .to paraphrase Brecht, racism is a bitch in heat at the moment [in 43
2004] and there’s no telling how large the litter will be. (Rolston,2004:6) 44
In a society characterised by sectarianism, accompanying violence and mistrust 45
of ‘the other’, racism became a ‘natural’ part of the whole ambit of hate crime 46
to which Northern Ireland is well-accustomed. Overt racism reared its ugly head 47
once again in April2009, when Northern Ireland and Polish football fans clashed 48
in Belfast before a World Cup qualifying match. The incident spilled over into 49
racist attacks against Polish residents, and some50 people fled the staunchly 50
loyalist Village area of south Belfast.
51
In an unrelated incident soon after, one hundred Roma families were forced 52
to take shelter in a church hall, evacuating their homes in the Lisburn Road area of 53
south Belfast after they were targeted by racists. The incident made international 54
news and underscored Northern Ireland’s reputation as intolerant and a centre of 55
race hate crime. The scale of this hate crime against the Roma community and the 56
media coverage which it attracted with families fleeing their homes, belongings 57
in hand, prompted high-profile Childline founder, Esther Rantzen, to say of 58
Northern Ireland ‘they are addicted to hatred, they are addicted to violence as 59
if it gives them some kind of exhilaration. . .You see a lot of prejudice in the 60
rest of the UK but why turn it into violence? Maybe people miss the old days of 61
the Troubles’ (BBC Question Time,18June2009). The Anti Racism Network in 62
Northern Ireland were angry about the attacks on the Roma families, claiming the 63
families had been subjected to harassment for some months and had not received 64
adequate protection. They also accused local politicians of deliberately blaming 65
immigrants for the lack of jobs and resources caused by the global recession.
66
The country’s only minority ethnic elected representative, Alliance Party MLA, 67
Anna Lo, argued in a debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly that ‘in order to 68
eliminate racism, we must also tackle sectarianism – the twin evils of prejudice’.
69
It is against this background that we attempt to examine three key questions:
70 71
• What has been the Government’s response in seeking to tackle increased 72
racism?
73
• Using the Government’s own performance criteria, how effective has their 74
approach been so far?
75
• What factors influence racist attitudes among people in Northern Ireland?
76
We begin with an overview of previous research on racism in Northern 77
Ireland.
78
The literature 79
The UK social policy literature, according to Craig (2007), has neglected the 80
issue of ‘race’ both as political practice and academic pursuit. He finds this a 81
striking omission because social policy as a discipline is concerned variously with 82
citizenship rights, welfare, equality, poverty alleviation and social engineering.
83
Craig offers evidence to illustrate that the British state is only marginally 84
concerned with the welfare of minorities. He listed: continuing discrimination 85
against minorities, the failure of social welfare to maintain adequate incomes, 86
residential segregation of minorities and evidence of structural racism and 87
discrimination in education and health services. Craig (2007:620) concludes 88
that despite a number of ‘community relations’ initiatives and race relations 89
legislative interventions that ‘racism persists in all welfare sectors’.
90
The most obvious point of comparison for Northern Ireland within the wider 91
UK literature is on the theme of community cohesion. The racial disturbances in 92
Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in May2001and subsequent investigations found 93
people living ethnically segregated lives. As a response, policy interventions were 94
aimed at strengthening cohesion, the new framework for British government 95
policy on race relations (Cantle,2005). The subsequent work of Paul Thomas 96
(2007), who examined how community cohesion is operationalised by youth 97
workers in Oldham, provides evidence of the intervention in practice. Although 98
community cohesion has been criticised (Kundnani, 2002) as an attack on 99
multi-culturalism and a throw-back to assimilation policies (Backet al.,2002; 100
Schuster and Solomos,2004), Thomas is positive about the potential offered by 101
meaningful direct contact among people of different ethnic backgrounds. The 102
interesting comparison with Northern Ireland is that ‘meaningful contact’ has 103
been the underpinning rationale for much of the community relations work 104
addressing religious segregation in the parallel lives of Catholics and Protestants 105
from the1980s onwards. Hence, a plethora of policy interventions in Northern 106
Ireland have been about increasing interaction, integration, shared space and 107
shared values, culminating in the policy documentA Shared Future(OFMDFM, 108
2005a). The parallel in Great Britain was Cantle’s idea of a shared vision 109
around a common set of values which could be homogenising for the different 110
communities. This approach has also informed policies in Northern Ireland 111
aimed at tackling racism as evidenced by the links between the government 112
‘good relations’ and ‘racial equality’ strategies.
113
Northern Ireland, understandably, is replete with literature that analyses its 114
protracted conflict and constitutional settlement. Such scholarship has crowded 115
out, to some extent, the academic analysis of the insidious problem of racism.
116
This is the starting point for a review of the literature on racism in Northern 117
Ireland, which could broadly be categorised under four key themes: a denial 118
of the problem, evidence of institutional racism, racism incidents and crime 119
and, finally, suggested links between sectarianism and racism. We structure the 120
reporting of the research under these broad headings.
121
Denial of the problem 122
Hainsworth (1998: 1) drew attention to the whole issue of racism in a 123
collection of research, the aim of which was to counter the suggestion ‘that racism 124
is not a problem in Northern Ireland’. He argued that one of the consequences of 125
the conflict has been ‘the tendency to neglect, ignore or minimise ethnic minority 126
problems, such as individual or institutional racism, as the preoccupation 127
with traditional socio-political matters has left scant room for other agendas’
128
(Hainsworth,1998:3). In the same collection, McVeigh also contended that there 129
was an overt denial that racism existed in Northern Ireland because there were 130
no black people, yet argued that minority ethnic people experienced systematic 131
racism: ‘it is not the absence of racism but rather the relative absence of discussion 132
of racism which makes Ireland different from most European countries’ (1998: 133
14). McVeigh goes on to suggest that, because sectarianism pervades Northern 134
Ireland, it also structures the way in which racism is reproduced and experienced.
135
He concluded:
136
when we look at the ways in which social relations between the minority and majority ethnic 137
communities in Northern Ireland have become racialised, it becomes clear that racism is 138
structured by sectarianism as a dominating feature. . .In other words, racism in Northern 139
Ireland has a certain specificity. (McVeigh,1998:31) 140
Evidence of institutional racism 141
Mann-Kler (1997) conducted action research using39focus groups to capture 142
the experiences of minority ethnic groups using public services in Northern 143
Ireland such as health, social services, social security, education and training, 144
housing and policing, and found widespread evidence of institutional racism.
145
Findings included: minority ethnic groups had little knowledge of preventative 146
healthcare services, due to a lack of accessible information; racial harassment 147
of some families had been severe; and many women felt that the police did not 148
take racial attacks seriously. Mann-Kler contended that it has only been since the 149
ceasefires in1994that attention to racism began to emerge on the wider public 150
agenda. Connolly (2002), in an overview of available research evidence on race 151
and racism in Northern Ireland, found that although there is significant diversity 152
within the minority ethnic population, and hence differing needs, there were 153
several common problems that they faced. These problems included: difficulties 154
accessing existing services by those who speak little or no English, general lack 155
of knowledge and/or awareness of particular services offered, the need for more 156
staff training by service providers in relation to issues of ‘race’, the failure to 157
meet the basic cultural needs of minority ethnic people and significant levels of 158
racism and racist harassment experienced by minority ethnic people in Northern 159
Ireland (see also Bellet al.’s research,2004, on the social problems and personal 160
needs of people moving to Northern Ireland to take up employment).
161
Racism incidents/crimes 162
Jarman and Monaghan (2003) report on the scale and nature of racial 163
harassment based on an analysis of racist incidents recorded by the police between 164
1996and2001. They noted that, although the number of recorded incidents was 165
relatively small, Northern Ireland had a high ratio of racist incidents for the size 166
of the minority ethnic population compared with England and Wales during 167
this period. Precise comparison between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is 168
difficult to make. Home Office police-recorded crime statistics for England and 169
Wales in2008/09show a total of34,231incidents involving racially/religiously 170
aggravated crime disaggregated by: inflicting grievous body harm (GBH), less 171
serious wounding, harassment/public, assault without injury, actual bodily harm 172
(ABH) or other injury (Home Office,2009). During2008/09, Northern Ireland 173
recorded1,788sectarian and racist crimes in2008/09(PSNI statistics). Taking into 174
account population size, England and Wales had0.63and Northern Ireland1.00 175
hate crimes per1,000population, respectively. The Republic of Ireland does not 176
record hate crime; figures are subsumed under wider categories such as assaults, 177
harassment and related offences. The most numerous forms of racist harassment 178
in Northern Ireland were abuse and attacks on property, but about one-quarter 179
of the incidents involved a form of physical assault. Almost half the incidents 180
occurred in Belfast, most of which were recorded in Protestant working-class 181
areas.
182
Empirical findings from a detailed study of the incidence of racial crime in 183
the London Borough of Newham indicated significantly higher rates where there 184
was a large white majority and smaller groups of other ethnicities (Brimicombe 185
et al.,2001). Given the higher per capita influx of migrant workers to Northern 186
Ireland than other parts of the UK (discussed later), the ethnic mix could well 187
be important in understanding the level of racism in loyalist areas. Jarman 188
(2003) also examined the relationship between racist harassment and children 189
and young people by considering evidence from police records of cases of such 190
abuse and associated violence. He found that young people are more likely 191
to be subjected to physical assault as part of any harassment, but, equally, 192
young people were also significant perpetrators of racism and racist harassment.
193
Jarman concluded ‘the stereotypical perpetrator of racist harassment in Northern 194
Ireland is a young white male over the age of 16 acting in consort with 195
other young white males’ (2003:138). An interesting comparison here is with 196
a Home Office study which looked at the perpetrators of racial harassment 197
and violence in two London boroughs and found that: young children, youths, 198
adults and older people, including pensioners (male and female in all groups) 199
were involved. Their views towards minority ethnic groups were shared by the 200
wider communities to which they belonged. Perpetrators saw this as legitimising 201
their actions (Sibbitt,1997). Rayet al.’s study (2004:364) on the perpetrators of 202
racist violence in Greater Manchester also found that when ‘inherited meanings 203
of territory and neighbourhood become factured and uncertain’, there is an 204
unacknowledged shame which can be transformed into rage against minority 205
ethnic communities. In this case English communities had once shared experience 206
of the manufacturing industry; territoriality in Northern Ireland is quite different 207
and relates to single-identity communities now seen by perpetrators of racial 208
violence as under threat from ‘outsiders’ (ethnic minorities).
209
The link between sectarianism and racism 210
It was Brewer (1992) who first juxtaposed sectarianism and racism. He began 211
by offering a definition of sectarianism and compared it to the concept of racism.
212
He argued that there were points of convergence but also differences. Racism 213
and sectarianism converge in the sense that both involve ‘social stratification, 214
producing inequality in a structured manner rather than randomly’ and there 215
are similarities in the way in which they are experienced ‘at the level of ideas, 216
individual action and social structure’. The key difference is that ‘race’ is a much 217
more visible and deterministic marker than ‘sect’ and overlaps more completely 218
with other important social boundaries such as class’ – sect is more ambiguous, 219
a sub-type of ethnic stratification, whereas religion is one source of ethnic 220
differentiation. As a result, Brewer contended that ‘sect’ has better explanatory 221
power ‘to account for patterns of stratification and life chances that occur under 222
its name’ (Brewer,1992:353).
223
McVeigh and Rolston argue that sectarianism is a form of racism rooted in 224
the process of British imperialism in Ireland, and sectarianism can be directly 225
attributed to ‘the nature of the state rather than the politics it contains’ (2007: 226
7). Sectarianism, they contend, prevailed during the Stormont era of Unionist 227
majority rule (1920–72), continued during direct rule by the British Government, 228
is still evident in the post-Good Friday Northern Ireland and is inadequately 229
addressed through a ‘good relations’ model which seeks to conjoin racism and 230
sectarianism. The Good Friday Agreement, they claim, ‘helped create the context 231
in which new levels of racism were to flourish’. A peaceful Northern Ireland and, 232
in turn, economic growth attracted migrant workers who located in less crowded 233
loyalist working-class areas, so ‘post-Good Friday Agreement, new communities 234
of colour found themselves situated in the midst of this volatile situation and 235
became key targets for loyalist rage’ and, as a result, racism became a ‘close ally 236
of sectarianism’ (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007:12). The researchers argue that 237
explanations for the rise in racism have included ‘the facile logic that there is a 238
finite amount of hate in Northern Ireland and now, given the dying throes of 239
sectarianism in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement, racism has increased’.
240
They challenge what they see as the errors in this assumption:
241
For a start, people are perfectly capable of being both sectarian and racist. Moreover, as the 242
concentration of racist attacks in loyalist areas reveals, being sectarian is an advantage in being 243
racist. But the state’s approach to racism fails to name the problem, avoiding the obvious and 244
problematic correlation between loyalism and racism to focus on the problem being that of two 245
generic camps: ‘them’ and ‘us’. (McVeigh and Rolston,2007:13) 246
The link between sectarianism and racism is also recognised at the European 247
level. For example, the European Union adopted two directives (2000/43/EC and 248
2000/78/EC) prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of racial 249
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. The 250
Commission has since then set out an overarching strategy for the positive and 251
active promotion of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all. In the 252
context of Northern Ireland the link between sectarianism and racism and the 253
policy instruments used to address both is made clear by government when it 254
stated that the 255
Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations aims to eliminate both racism and 256
sectarianism. . .the policies and mechanisms being put in place to implement good relations 257
are not just about the scourge of sectarianism. They apply equally to tackling racism and 258
promoting good race relations. (OFMDFM,2005b:10) 259
This joint approach is justified by government on the basis that the common goal 260
is to create a shared society defined by a culture of tolerance, whether on racial or 261
religious grounds, characterised by equity, respect for diversity and recognition 262
of mutual interdependence. Hence, there are common policy instruments to 263
tackle racism and sectarianism: legal protection, policies and practices aimed at 264
mainstreaming the fight against racism and sectarianism, acting in partnership 265
with civil society to tackle the underlying causes and education and awareness 266
raising to encourage human rights education in the school curriculum and higher 267
education institutions.
268
There are two things which come out of this review of the literature. First, is 269
the problem, as McVeigh and Rolston contend, of ‘an obvious and problematic 270
correlation between loyalism and racism’? They produce no empirical evidence 271
of this. Second, existing research appears to focus on institutional racism and a 272
gap exists in our understanding as to what motivates or influences people in their 273
racist attitudes and behaviour to earn Northern Ireland this media sobriquet, the 274
‘race hate capital of Europe’.
275
Connolly and Khaoury (2008:207–8) confirm that much of the research to 276
date has concentrated on institutional racism in Northern Ireland, and, while 277
they acknowledge that this has been important in drawing attention to the 278
structural and routine nature of racial discrimination, there has been too much 279
emphasis on this as a way of conceptualising the problem. They suggest the need 280
‘to begin naming and interrogating whiteness. . .to address racism at its source’
281
and highlight different approaches taken by nationalist and unionist politicians, 282
leaders of loyalism and republicanism in their responses to race issues in Northern 283
Ireland, calling for research in this area. A recent example is where a Democratic 284
Unionist Party Member of the Legislative Assembly in a debate in the Northern 285
Ireland Assembly, demanded local jobs for local people:
286
We must face reality. As a result of the recession, a number of migrant workers have returned 287
to their own countries. A practical and sensitive approach must be taken to calls for jobs to be 288
retained for our own local workers. Although we are aware of the immense contribution that 289
migrant workers make, nevertheless, in the middle of a recession and in the face of increased 290
unemployment, we must get our priorities right in securing employment for our local people.
291
(Buchanan,2009:35) 292
The comparative example here is the debate in Great Britain that racialised 293
tensions are fuelled by competition for scarce resources. Denchet al.(2006) exam- 294
ined the hostility directed towards Bangladeshis by white East Enders in London.
295
Initially, tensions emerged over competition for work. While this remains an issue, 296
increasingly it has been replaced by competition between the communities over 297
access to welfare support and public services, including education and housing.
298
Denchet al.explain this as follows: ‘the state reception of new comers has ridden 299
over the existing local community’s assumptions about their ownership of public 300
resources’ which ‘precipitated a loss of confidence in the fairness of British social 301
democracy’ (2006:229). Hence, minority ethnic groups compete for opportuni- 302
ties and social welfare on equal terms with white Britons without ‘appearing to 303
have earned their rights’ to do so. In other words, a stable democracy demands 304
a ‘fair balance between what citizens put into society and what they get out of it’
305
(Denchet al.,2006:224). The researchers contend that middle-class liberals have 306
‘promoted a swathe of political measures and institutions which consolidate the 307
rights of minorities while multiplying the sanctions against indigenous whites 308
who object to this’ (Denchet al.,2006:6). In short, the increased emphasis on 309
people’s rights has been at the expense of their responsibilities.
310
Although Denchet al.’s work has been criticised by Moore (2008:350) as 311
‘lacking in intellectual coherence’ and being conceptually confusing, issues raised 312
in their work resonate in the Northern Ireland context. For example, there is a 313
protracted debate about the introduction of a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland, 314
which grapples with tensions between rights and responsibilities. Specifically, 315
there are recommendations to strengthen the right to equality and prohibition 316
of discrimination for national minorities, supplementary to the Human Rights 317
Act1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (Northern Ireland 318
Human Rights Commission,2008:33). Against this backdrop, Northern Ireland 319
politicians claiming protection for local jobs can be accused of racism or 320
xenophobia. These comments have been prompted by the economic downturn.
321
Until recently it was recognised that migrant workers filled skills gaps in specific 322
sectors of the Northern Ireland economy (health, food processing, construction, 323
hospitality and retail). Have attitudes to migrant workers changed as threats to 324
‘local’ jobs increase? Can the rise in racist incidents and crimes be explained (in 325
part) by competition for jobs?
326
Before addressing the substantive issues raised by existing research, we 327
consider the size of the minority ethnic community in Northern Ireland, what 328
the Government’s existing policies are to tackle racism and how they have 329
performed to date.
330
The policy context 331
The minor ethnic population 332
The2001Northern Ireland Census quantified the size of the settled minority 333
ethnic communities as14,279, or0.8per cent of the total population (1.68million 334
at that time). This figure comprised: Chinese as the largest minority ethnic group 335
(4,100), South Asians (2,500), Irish Travellers (1,700) and African Caribbeans 336
(1,100) (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,2005). The census statis- 337
tics are now dated, and some researchers estimate that the current figure could 338
be as high as45,000(Gallagher,2007). Transient populations are more difficult 339
to estimate. The number of people who came to live in Northern Ireland was 340
approximately:25,000in2005,31,000in2006,32,000in2007and27,000in2008, 341
around5per cent of the Northern Ireland workforce (Northern Ireland Statistics 342
and Research Agency,2009). This represents a marked increase in international 343
inflows and is related to the enlargement of the European Union in May2004, 344
when people from countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the so-called A8 345
countries) were allowed to come and work in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
346
One measure of the influx of migrant workers is the Worker Registration 347
Scheme (WRS) managed by the UK Border Agency on behalf of the Home 348
Office. The scheme is used to register migrant workers from the A8countries.
349
Border Agency statistics show between1May2004and31March2009, a total 350
of949,000people registered with the WRS in the United Kingdom. Of these, 351
36,500(or4per cent of the UK total) registered to work in Northern Ireland.
352
In contrast, the Northern Ireland population makes up around3per cent of the 353
UK population, thus indicating the scale of A8migration to Northern Ireland.
354
Table1shows that between May2004and March2009, Northern Ireland had 355
about one-third more migrant workers registering on a per capita basis than the 356
rest of the United Kingdom, with about21 WRS registrations for every1,000 357
persons in Northern Ireland compared to nearly16WRS registrations for every 358
1,000persons in the UK as a whole (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 359
Agency,2009:10). Overall, the statistics indicate an increasing number of settled 360
TABLE1. WRS registrations per1,000population (May2004–March2009)
WRS registrations WRS registrations
(May2004–March 2007population per1,000
Country 2009) estimate population
England 808,500 51,092,000 15.8
Scotland 79,500 5,144,000 15.4
Wales 25,000 2,980,000 8.3
Northern Ireland 36,500 1,759,000 20.8
United Kingdom 949,000 60,975,000 15.6
Source:Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2009).
minority ethnic communities in Northern Ireland and a relatively large influx of 361
migrant workers from2004onwards.
362
Government policy 363
In July2005, the (direct rule) Government launched its policy documentA 364
Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland2005–10, which aimed: to tackle racial 365
inequalities in Northern Ireland and to open up opportunity for all, to eradicate 366
racism and hate crime and, together withA Shared Future, to initiate actions to 367
promote good race relations (OFMDFM,2005b:5; Hughes,2008). The strategy 368
defined racism to include: racist ideologies, prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory 369
behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalised practices resulting in 370
racial inequality. The race strategy was underpinned by, and intended to com- 371
plement, the existing and developing legislative framework including the Race 372
Relations (Northern Ireland) Order1997and statutory duties set out in Section75 373
of the Northern Ireland Act1998. The Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 374
1997 made it unlawful to discriminate, either directly or indirectly, on racial 375
grounds in the areas of: employment and training; education; the provision of 376
goods, facilities or services; and the disposal and management of premises and 377
advertisements. The Northern Ireland Act1998(section75) requires departments 378
and other public authorities in carrying out their functions to have ‘due regardto 379
the need to promote equality of opportunity between persons of different racial 380
group’. It also requires them to ‘have regardto the desirability of promoting good 381
relations’ between persons of different racial group. There is an acknowledgement 382
in the strategy that government cannot, by itself, eradicate racism but would 383
play its part alongside other stakeholders in tackling this insidious problem.
384
To achieve the aims as outlined in the Racial Equality Strategy, a follow-on 385
implementation plan was launched in March2006, which committed government 386
departments and their agencies to a wide range of actions to tackle racism and 387
racial inequalities. The Government’s response to racism, according to the First 388
Minister, was robust and well-funded. The problem has been over-hyped by the 389
media and rested with a tiny minority of racist people (Robinson,2009:288).
390
Effectiveness of Racial Equality Strategy?
391
Does the government’s defence of its record on tackling racism stand up to 392
scrutiny? We consider how the government has performed against its ownRacial 393
Equality Strategy. The analysis is structured in the following way:
394
• Using baseline indicators from the Office of First Minister and deputy First 395
Minister’sShared Future and Racial Equality Strategy Baseline Report(2007), 396
we track trends in racism over time. In other words, if the government 397
was reporting progress in tackling racism in Northern Ireland using itsown 398
indicators, how effective has it been?
399
• We consider the social distance scale, an alternative to the government’s 400
measures above, as a means of capturing racism in a one-dimensional way.
401
This social distance measure of racism is then used to investigate McVeigh and 402
Rolston’s (2007) assertion in the literature that sectarianism may structure 403
how racism is produced and reproduced. The link between sectarianism and 404
racism is therefore empirically tested.
405
• Finally, using the most recent Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data 406
(2008/09) , we attempt to model the influences on people’s racist attitudes. Q1 407
In other words, which factors are likely to impact on whether someone in 408
Northern Ireland is racist? We do this using multi-variate binary logistic 409
regression and arrive at a combination of factors that predict (within limits) 410
racist attitudes in Northern Ireland.
411
We begin by assessing government’s performance in tackling racism. The 412
Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) developed a 413
number of thematic priorities to improve good relations in Northern Ireland and 414
linked these to a set of measurable outcomes. These were part of the outworking of 415
the Government’sShared FutureandRacial Equalitystrategies. The first priority 416
outcome established by OFMDFM is that: ‘Northern Ireland society is free from 417
racism, sectarianism and prejudice’ (Office of the First Minister and deputy First 418
Minister and Northern Ireland Statistics Agency,2007:8).
419
Baseline indicators were established as a way of quantitatively tracking racism 420
trends in Northern Ireland. Thespecificracism indicators in the OFMDFM report 421
are set out in Table 2. We have collated current information on eachof these 422
indicators to provide a rounded picture on the effectiveness of the government’s 423
strategy since its inception to tackle racism.
424
Indicator 1: Number of racial incidents and crimes recorded 425
The data on racist incidents and crimes have been collected from the Police Service 426
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) annual crime statistics beginning with baseline year 427
TABLE2. Base line indicators – racism measures
General Year of
Baseline historic Data baseline
Indicators figures trend source data
No1: Number of racial incidents and crimes recorded
Racial incidents= 936Racial crimes=746
Incidents – up by15%;
Crimes – up by18% (since 2004/05)
PSNI 2005/06
No.2: Percentage of people who believe there is more racial prejudice than there was5years ago
68% Up from12% in 1994
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey Data (1994)
2005
No.3: Percentage of people who believe there will be more racial prejudice in5years time
43% Up from11% in 1994
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey Data (1994)
2005
No.4: Percentage of people who believe people from a minority ethnic community are less respected than they once were
49% n/a Northern
Ireland Life and Times Survey Data
2005
No.5: Percentage of people who are prejudiced against a minority ethnic community
‘Very prejudiced’
=1%; ‘A little prejudiced’= 24%
Since1994:
‘Very’=no change; ‘A little’=up from10%
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey Data (1994)
2005
Source:Extracted from: Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister and Northern Ireland Statistics Agency (2007)A Shared Future and Racial Equality Strategy: Good Relations Indicators Baseline Report.
2004/05. The PSNI define a racial incident as any incident, which may or may 428
not constitute a criminal offence, which is perceived by the victim or any other 429
person as being motivated by prejudice or hate. In addition, we collected data on 430
sectarian incidents and crimes over the same period to provide some basis for 431
comparison. These data are presented in Figure1. The data show a trend increase 432
over the five-year period in racial incidents/crimes and corresponding decrease 433
in sectarian incidents/crimes. In short, as sectarian crimes have decreased, racist 434
incidents have increased.
435
It should, however, be noted that data on the number of racial incidents/
436
crimes must be set within a context of an active campaign by the PSNI 437
to encourage reporting. Minority ethnic groups claimed that they had little 438
confidence in reporting hate crime to the police in an enquiry conducted by the 439
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. This resulted in a recommendation that the 440
1470
1217
1056 1017
634
746
861
757 771
500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Sectarian crimes Racist crimes Linear (Sectarian crimes) Linear (Racist crimes)
Number of sectarian and racist incidents/crimes: trend data1
9 0 / 8 0 0 2 8 0 / 7 0 0 2 7 0 / 6 0 0 2 6 0 / 5 0 0 2 5 0 / 4 0 0 2 Total number of sectarian incidents
n/a 1,701 1,695 1,584 1,595
Total number of sectarian crimes
n/a 1,470 1,217 1,056 1,017
Total number of racist incidents
813 936 1,047 976 990
Total number of racist crimes
634 746 861 757 771
Figure1. Racism and sectarian trends
Note:1Recorded racist crimes (sometimes referred to as notifiable offences) are those which are deemed to be indictable or triable-either-way. In the same way as incidents are identified as having a hate motivation, a crime will be recorded as having the relevant hate motivation where the victim or any other person perceives it as such. Not all incidents will result in the recording of a crime. Crimes with hate motivations are classified according to the Home Office counting rules.
Source:Collated from PSNI annual crime statistics reports; available at: www.psni.police.uk/
index/updates/updates_statistics.htm
police work closely with other statutory agencies and victim support groups to 441
‘improve general confidence in the reporting system, address reasons for under- 442
reporting and unwillingness to prosecute’ (House of Commons, Northern Ireland 443
Affairs Committee,2004:49). The PSNI published a policy directive in2006, 444
‘Police Response to Hate Incidents’, in which they acknowledged the reasons for 445
under-reporting and put in place a series of measures to address this problem. The 446
measures included: improved recording, response and investigation procedures 447
on hate crime incidents; having specialist officers (Minority Liaison Officers) 448
available in every police district; support for victims; partnership working with 449
statutory and non-statutory partners to address the problem; and training for 450
officers in the implementation of the directive. The outworking of this policy can 451
be seen in high-profile publicity campaigns launched by the PSNI and aimed at 452
68 70
63
53 43
54
41
31
20 40 60 80
2005 2006 2007 2008
%
Prejudice now Prejudice in the future
Linear (Prejudice now) Linear (Prejudice in the future) Racial prejudice now and in five years time: data
2005
(n = 1,200) 2006
(n = 1,230) 2007
(n = 1,179) 2008 (n = 1,216) More prejudice now than 5
years ago
68% 70% 63% 53%
There will be more prejudice in 5 years time
43% 54% 41% 31%
Figure2. Prejudice trends
Source:Calculated from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data2005–2008/09.
encouraging the reporting and awareness of hate crimes and incidents under the 453
advertising banner ‘nobody deserves it and nobody deserves to get away with it’.
454
The remaining indicators (nos. 2–5 in Table 2) for measuring racism 455
are attitudinal data collected via an annual probability survey of inhabitants 456
across Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys gather 457
information through face-to-face interviews with about1,200adults aged18years 458
or over. The samples for the annual surveys consist of a systematic random sample 459
of addresses selected from the government’s Land and Property Services Agency 460
list of private addresses.1 461
Data have therefore been extracted from the yearly surveys to provide an 462
overview of racism in Northern Ireland as defined by OFMDFM indicators. The 463
first two indicators we consider here relate to perceptions of racism now and in 464
five years time.
465
Indicator 2: Percentage of people who believe there is more racial prejudice 466
than there was five years ago 467
Indicator 3: Percentage of people who believe there will be more racial prejudice 468
in five years time 469
The results of these two indicators are set out in Figure2, where the trend lines 470
indicate a reduction in perceptions of prejudice: in other words, people believe 471
49
53
42 44
30 40 50 60
2005 2006 2007 2008
%
Respect for ethnic minorities Linear (Respect for ethnic minorities) Respect for minority ethnic communities: data
2005
(n = 1,200) 2006
(n = 1,230) 2007
(n = 1,179) 2008 (n = 1,216) Less well respected 49% 53% 42% 44%
Figure3. Respect for ethnic minorities
Source:Calculated from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data2005–2008/09.
there is less prejudice now than previously and this trend will continue into the 472
future.
473
Indicator 4: Percentage of people who believe people from a minority ethnic 474
community are less respected than they once were 475
The results are set out in Figure3. The data show the percentage of people who 476
‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ that minority ethnic communities are less respected 477
in Northern Ireland than they once were. The trend would seem to indicate 478
a growing acceptance of, and respect for, minority ethnic groups, although it 479
should be borne in mind that these data do not include the recent high-profile 480
racist incidents in2009. 481
Indicator 5: Percentage of people who are prejudiced against a minority ethnic 482
community 483
The results are shown in Figure4and indicate an increased trend in self-reported 484
prejudice.
485
So, what do these results, using measures devised by OFMDFM, tell us 486
about the priority theme of government that ‘Northern Ireland is free from 487
racism and prejudice’? Is the government’sRacial Equality Strategysuccessful, 488
based on its own indicators of effectiveness? If the above indicators constitute a 489
‘shopping basket’ of composite measures devised by government to capture the 490
25 24
34
32
20 30 40 50
2005 2006 2007 2008
%
How prejudiced? Linear (How prejudiced?) How prejudiced are you (data)?
2005
(n = 1,200) 2006
(n = 1,230) 2007
(n = 1,179) 2008 (n =1,216)
Very prejudiced 1% 1% 3% 2%
A little prejudiced 24% 23% 32% 30%
TOTAL 25% 24% 34% 32%
Figure4. How prejudiced are you?
Source:Calculated from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data2005–2008/09.
extent of racism and prejudice in Northern Ireland, then we can conclude the 491
following:
492
• There is an upward trend in the number of reported racist incidents/crimes 493
and corresponding decrease in sectarian incidents/crimes officially recorded 494
by the PSNI.
495
• Respondents think that there is less racial prejudice now than five years ago, 496
and there will be less prejudice in five years time.
497
• The level of respect for minority ethnic communities has improved over the 498
last four years, although the very public events of2009are not reflected in 499
the data, and one suspects would significantly change people’s viewpoint on 500
this issue.
501
• Respondents considered themselves to be increasingly more prejudiced 502
against minority ethnic communities over time – a result which is somewhat 503
at odds with the finding (above) that racial prejudice at the macro level has 504
reduced over time and into the future (but, again, the data do not reflect the 505
events of2009).
506
In summary, the Government can take little solace from the implementation 507
of itsRacial Equality Strategy. Northern Ireland has some way to go before being 508
described as a country ‘free from racism and prejudice’ – the declared aim of the 509
strategy.
510
The extent of racism 511
But are the Government’s measures of racism, as outlined above, a true indication 512
of the extent of racism in Northern Ireland? How valid and reliable, for example, 513
are the data from a question which asks people directly if they would describe 514
themselves as prejudiced (indicator5above)? Such a measure is more likely to 515
underestimate the extent of racism in Northern Ireland because respondents are 516
unwilling to admit to being prejudiced or racist, as this is a socially undesirable 517
viewpoint. Hence, this type of questioning is flawed and does not take into account 518
the many different kinds of racial prejudice that exist: from blatant forms, such 519
as name-calling, to more subtle racial prejudice that includes racist banter and 520
‘jokes’. Furthermore, respondents themselves may have different opinions about 521
what constitutes racism and therefore interpret the question differently.
522
A more reliable measure of racial prejudice can be found in questions 523
relating to social distance, although these are not without limitations and can also 524
underestimate levels of racial prejudice. Questions relating to social distance in 525
the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey are based on a variant of the Bogardus 526
(1925) social distance scale, which measures the willingness of respondents 527
to participate in social contact with specific groups of people. The scale is a 528
psychological test which uses a cumulative or Guttman scale to determine the 529
degree of closeness with members of other ethnic groups. The questions posed 530
in the2008/09Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey are as follows:
531
Would you accept people from other ethnic groups as:
532
䊏 Tourists in Northern Ireland?
533
䊏 A resident of Northern Ireland living and working here?
534
䊏 A resident in your local area?
535
䊏 A colleague?
536
䊏 A close friend?
537
䊏 A relative by marriage?
538
This type of questioning is cumulative in that if a respondent in the survey 539
accepts or agrees with one particular item, (s)he will also accept all previous 540
items. Hence, if a survey respondent accepts someone from another ethnic group 541
as a relative by marriage, (s)he is also likely to accept people from minority 542
ethnic groups as a close friend, colleague, resident in the local area and so on.
543
The simplicity of such a scale means that we can arrive at a one-dimensional 544
assessment of racial attitudes. Although the scale has been criticised as too simple 545
in that the social distance between intimate relationships may be quite different 546
than those with, for example, tourists in Northern Ireland, it is nonetheless an 547
effective way of probing the extent or degree of racial attitudes. In other words, 548
those respondents who would accept people from other ethnic groups as a relative 549
by marriage exhibit no social distance and therefore no prejudice. This is therefore 550
TABLE3. Social distance scale on prejudice (n=1,216)
Would you accept people from other ethnic groups as: Yes
Tourists in Northern Ireland? 98%
A resident of Northern Ireland living and working here? 91%
A resident in your local area? 89%
A colleague? 90%
A close friend? 80%
A relative by marriage? 76%
Source:Calculated from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data2008/09.
a one-dimensional measure that becomes useful in further analysis of racism in 551
Northern Ireland.
552
If we consider the results of2008/09Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 553
on the above questions, they largely confirm the cumulative nature of the social 554
distance approach with respondents ‘pressed’ to discover the degree of social 555
distance they could accept (see Table 3). Respondents become less willing to 556
accept minority ethnic groups the closer the social distance, and hence accepting 557
someone from another ethnic group as ‘a relative by marriage’ is a more accurate 558
measure of racism than simply asking them ‘are you prejudiced’ (indicator5 559
above).
560
Does sectarianism shape racism?
561
The theoretical literature suggests that racism is the new sectarianism in 562
Northern Ireland or that sectarianism may structure how racism is produced 563
and reproduced (McVeigh,1998). The literature also suggests that racism and 564
sectarianism are inter-related in that they both have similar roots and expression, 565
and sectarianism may lead to less receptive attitudes towards minority ethnic 566
people. This theoretical contention has not been tested empirically. In an 567
effort to explore the relationship between these two variables (sectarianism and 568
racism), the following questions from the2008/09Northern Ireland Life and 569
Times Survey data set were used as proxy measures of sectarianism and racism, 570
respectively:
571
(a) Measuring sectarianism:
572
䊏 Would you mind if a close relative were to marry someone of a different religion?
573
According to Connolly and Keenan (2000:29), unwillingness to accept those from 574
the other religion, be it Catholic or Protestant, as friends, colleagues or as relatives 575
by marriage ‘could be loosely termed as sectarianism’.
576
TABLE4. Sectarianism by racism (n=1,185)
Accept minority ethnic as a relative by marriage Marry someone of a
different religion YES NO Total
Would mind a lot Count 31 26 57
% within marry someone of a different religion
54.4% 45.6% 100.0%
% of total 2.6% 2.2% 4.8%
Would mind a little Count 99 86 185
% within marry someone of a different religion
53.5% 46.5% 100.0%
% of total 8.4% 7.3% 15.6%
Would not mind Count 774 169 943
% within marry someone of a different religion
82.1% 17.9% 100.0%
% of total 65.3% 14.3% 79.6%
Total Count 904 281 1,185
% of total 76.3% 23.7% 100.0%
(b) Measuring racism:
577
The variable which we use as a proxy for prejudice or racism is the social distance 578
measure discussed above:
579
䊏 Would you be willing to accept people from other minority ethnic groups as a 580
relative by way of marrying a close member of your family?
581
We cross-tabulate these two variables using data from the Northern Ireland 582
Life and Times Social Attitudes2008/09to find if there is an association between 583
sectarian and racist attitudes. The results are presented in Tables4and5. 584
Considering the results in Table4we can see that:
585
• 82per cent of those who ‘would not mind’ marrying someone from a different 586
religion would also accept a minority ethnic relative by marriage.
587
• Whereas only54per cent of those who ‘mind a lot’ or ‘mind a little’ marrying 588
someone from a different religion would also accept a minority ethnic relative 589
by marriage.
590
The results therefore tell us that there is a significant association (see Table5) 591
between people’s attitudes to marrying someone of a different religion and their 592
willingness to accept a member of the minority ethnic community as a close 593
family member. This highly significant result (χ2=85.64,p<0.001) indicates 594
TABLE5. Chi-square tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square 85.6371 2 0.000
Likelihood ratio 77.238 2 0.000
Linear-by-linear Association 73.666 1 0.000
N of valid cases 1,185
Notes:10cells (.0%) have expected count less than5. The minimum expected count is13.52.
Summary result:χ2=85.64,p<0.001.
Source:Calculated from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data2008/09.
that there is an association between sectarian and racist attitudes which people 595
in Northern Ireland hold: those with sectarian views are more likely to be racist.
596
What influences racism?
597
To further understand which factors influence or predict racist attitudes in 598
Northern Ireland, we conducted a binary logistic regression. The purpose of 599
this analysis is to assess the impact of a set of selected predictors on a dependent 600
variable: racist attitudes. In other words, we are interested in finding out which 601
variables predict the likelihood of people in Northern Ireland being racist. Binary 602
logistic regression allows us to test the predictive ability of a set of variables while 603
controlling for the effects of other predictors in the model. Using data from the 604
2008/09Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, we therefore select a categorical 605
dichotomous variable which is a proxy measure of racism and a set of predictor 606
variables.
607
The social distance variable, discussed above, in relation to whether someone 608
would be prepared to accept a member of the minority ethnic community as a 609
relative by marriage, appears to be a good proxy for measuring racism. We 610
therefore use this measure as the dependent variable in the logistic regression 611
analysis. We also list those predictor variables which we think might influence 612
whether someone is racist. These are set out in Table6. 613
The results of the binary logistic regression analysis using the variables above 614
are set out in Table7. The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a highly 615
significant value (p<0.0005), and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test supports the 616
conclusion that the model is a good fit (chi-square value of12.23and p>0.05). In 617
other words, the variables included in the model, when combined, are significant 618
predictors of racism. The model summary statistics indicate that between21.7 619
per cent and31.7per cent of the variability in the dependent variable is explained 620
by this set of predictor variables. The Wald test shows that there are five variables 621
which contribute significantly (p<0.05) to the predictive ability of the model, 622
and the negative/positive B values allows us to establish the relative importance 623
tacklingracisminnorthernireland21
Variable code Coding for
in NILTS Variable recoded binary
Variable 2008/09 or transformed logistic
types survey data Description of the variable in survey to: regression
Categorical dependent variable
MEGRELA Would you be willing to accept people from other ethnic minority groups as a relative by way of marrying a close relative of your family?
RACIST Yes/No
Predictor variable SMARRRLG Would you mind if a close relative were to marry someone of a different religion?
SECTARIAN Yes/No Predictor variable MIGWRK1 Do you agree that migrant workers are generally good for Northern
Ireland’s economy?
MIGRANTS Yes/No
Predictor variable OUTOFNI Have you ever lived outside Northern Ireland for more than6months? ABROAD Yes/No Predictor variable MEGCONT Do you have regular direct contact with people from minority ethnic
backgrounds?
CONTACT Yes/No
Predictor variable RAGE Age of respondent RAGE Respondent’s age
Predictor variable RSEX Gender of the respondent GENDER Male or female
Predictor variable RELIGCAT Religion of respondent RELIGION Catholic or Protestant
