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Social Policy & Society 10:1, 1–16
CCambridge University Press 2010 doi:10.1017/S1474746410000357
Peace Building in Northern Ireland: A Role for Civil Society
1
C o l i n K n o x 2
School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, University of Ulster, Shore Road, Jordanstown BT 37 OQB 3
E-mail: [email protected] 4
Northern Ireland has witnessed significant political progress with devolution and a power 5
sharing Executive in place since May 2007. These political achievements, however, 6
conceal a highly polarised society characterised by sectarianism and community divisions, 7
the legacy of a protracted conflict. This paper is located in the theoretical discourse 8
between consociationalists who argue that antithetical identities cannot be integrated and 9
advocates of social transformation who support greater cross-community peace-building 10
initiatives through the involvement of civil society. This theoretical debate is taking place 11
in a policy vacuum. The Northern Ireland Executive has abandoned its commitment to 12
the previous (direct rule) administration’s A Shared Future policy and is now considering 13
alternatives broadly described as community cohesion, sharing and integration. Using 14
a case study of a Protestant/Catholic interface community, this paper offers empirical 15
evidence of the effectiveness of one social transformation initiative involving community 16
groups in a highly segregated area of West Belfast.
17
I n t ro d u c t i o n 18
To the outside observer, the Northern Ireland ‘problem’ has, for all intents and purposes 19
been ‘solved’. Local political parties, in particular long-standing arch antagonists, the 20
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn F´ein, are now key players in a devolved 21
power-sharing Executive and Assembly, which has been functioning since May 2007. The 22
existing arrangements are rooted in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 that 23
provided for,inter alia, a devolved Assembly with full executive and legislative authority 24
for all matters that are the responsibility of Northern Ireland Government departments (so- 25
called ‘transferred matters’). Despite substantial public endorsements of the Agreement 26
via referenda in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (although the figures 27
concealed a split in unionist support) devolution faltered largely over decommissioning 28
of paramilitary weapons. From the inception of devolution in December 1999 until 29
October 2002, the Assembly was suspended four times with intermittent flurries of public 30
administration and legislative business conducted. The British Secretary of State dissolved 31
the Assembly in April 2003 leading (eventually) to elections in November of the same 32
year, after which it was restored to a state of suspension when local political parties 33
engaged in a review of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement with the aim of restoring 34
devolution.
35
A political break-through came in the form of the St Andrews Agreement in October 36
2006, which set out a timetable to restore devolution and fixed the date for the third 37
election to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Following the elections, devolved power was 38
1
Colin Knox
restored to the Assembly on 8 May 2007 with a power-sharing Executive comprising ten 39
ministers and two junior ministers: five Democratic Unionist, four Sinn F´ein, two Ulster 40
Unionist, and one Social Democratic and Labour Party. The Executive was headed by 41
Ian Paisley as First Minister (now replaced by Peter Robinson) and Martin McGuinness 42
as Deputy First Minister. Although Northern Ireland has witnessed many ‘historic break- 43
throughs’, a public meeting between Ian Paisley (then DUP leader) and Sinn F´ein leader 44
Gerry Adams carried huge symbolic significance as a turning point which copper-fastened 45
the peace process.
46
Public expectations for devolved government were high but delivery on key policy 47
issues has become bogged down in political disagreements between the two main parties 48
(DUP and Sinn F´ein). These have included a public squabble between the parties over 49
the how to address victims of the ‘troubles’, central to which were contested notions 50
of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ victims of violence; the latter being seen by some as 51
‘combatants’ in the conflict, and the former innocent parties somehow caught up in the 52
violence. Political controversy has also raged over the DUP’s refusal to enact legislation 53
to promote the use of the Irish language (pledged by the British Government in the St 54
Andrew’s Agreement), stalemate over Sinn F´ein’s Education Minister (Caitr´ıona Ruane) 55
commitment to end academic selection as a entry route to secondary level education and 56
a political fall-out over future policy on a replacement forA Shared Future. In addition, the 57
Executive failed to meet the May 2008 deadline agreed at St Andrews for the devolution 58
of policing and justice powers, prompting a reaction from Sinn F´ein which resulted in the 59
cancellation of Executive meetings for a five month period in 2008. Since then an uneasy 60
relationship exists between the two main parties in the Executive as they work through the 61
backlog of Executive business and face the problems of the global economic slow-down 62
and its implications for employment and public spending in Northern Ireland.
63
Although devolved government is facing some political difficulties (hardly 64
unexpected), statistics on the security situation illustrate just how much Northern Ireland 65
has moved towards a post-conflict society. In 2008/09 there were five security related 66
deaths compared to 44 in 1998/99, the year of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.
67
Security related incidents have also dropped significantly. There were 54 shooting and 68
46 bombing incidents in 2008/09, which compares with 358 and 318 respectively in 69
2001/02 (Chief Constable’s Annual Report, 2008/09). In short, the security situation shows Q1 70
major signs of improvement as the new political dispensation becomes embedded – 71
the Northern Ireland ‘problem’ has been ‘solved’.
72
The difficulty with this progress report on both the political and security situation 73
at the macro level in Northern Ireland is that it ignores the realities of extensive 74
community divisions, religious segregation and the problems of reconstruction after a 75
peace agreement has been signed (Darby, 2006; Boreret al., 2006). In a Government 76
consultation document (2003), aimed at improving community relations in Northern 77
Ireland, the following baseline evidence captures the extent of segregation:
78
• Violence at interfaces between communities continues to affect lives, property, business 79
and public services.
80
• Housing has become more segregated over the last 20 years – more than 70 per cent 81
of (public) Housing Executive estates are more than 90 per cent Protestant or more 82
than 90 per cent Catholic.
83
• Around 95 per cent of children still attend schools segregated by religion.
84
2
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
• There is little change in the extent of inter-community friendship patterns.
85
• People’s lives continue to be shaped by community division.
86
In summary, the consultation document concluded ‘Northern Ireland remains a deeply 87
segregated society with little indication of progress towards becoming more tolerant or 88
inclusive’ (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFM/DFM), 2003: 4).
89
The British Government’s response to this high degree of segregation came (during 90
suspended devolved arrangements) in the form of a policy document entitledA Shared 91
Future aimed at establishing over time ‘a society where there is equity, respect for 92
diversity and recognition of interdependence’ (OFM/DFM, 2005: 10). TheShared Future 93
implementation strategy was unequivocal in terms of improving relations between the 94
communities: ‘Separate but equal is not an option. Parallel living and the provision of 95
parallel services are unsustainable both morally and economically’ (OFM/DFM, 2005:
96
15, 2006, 2007). The British (direct rule) Government prioritised areas which were 97
deemed necessary to build a shared society, such as: tackling the visible manifestations 98
of sectarianism and racism, reclaiming shared space, reducing tensions at interface areas, 99
supporting good relations through cultural diversity and developing shared workspaces.
100
With the restoration of devolved government in 2007, the expectation was that 101
local politicians would embrace theShared Futurepolicy agenda. Instead the Executive’s 102
Programme for Government 2008–2011abandonedA Shared Futurewith the promise 103
that it would ‘bring forward a programme of cohesion and integration for this shared 104
and better future to address the divisions within our society and achieve measurable 105
reductions in sectarianism, racism and hate crime’ (Northern Ireland Executive, 2008:
106
12). Current disagreements between the DUP and Sinn F´ein have delayed progress on a 107
number of policies – this issue is part of the backlog of business.
108
The above stalemate and obvious disagreements on the way forward provide the 109
backdrop to this paper, the aim of which is to examine a case study of community 110
organisations which have sought to operationalise the principles ofA Shared Futureand 111
investigate empirical evidence of the effectiveness of their work. Specifically, the paper 112
will consider an interface area in West Belfast (Suffolk and Lenadoon) as an extreme 113
example of two highly segregated communities living cheek by jowl, blighted by violence, 114
sectarianism and social deprivation since the early 1970s. In a public policy vacuum it 115
will provide an analysis of their efforts to secure a shared future – the role played by civil 116
society in peace building.
117
T h e o re t i c a l c o n t e x t 118
The wider literature on conflict and peace building offers some insights into the 119
segregated society of Northern Ireland. Oberschall (2007), for example, in a comparative 120
study of the peace-building processes in Bosnia, Israel–Palestine and Northern Ireland 121
argues that peace settlements leave many loose ends on key issues in the conflict 122
to be dealt with during the implementation process. He supports the need for social 123
transformation or reconstruction policies that: encourage identities other than ethnicity, 124
provide inducements for inter-ethnic cooperation where there are non-partisan public 125
symbols and shared institutions rather than segregation and avoidance – the converse of 126
the principle ‘good fences make good ethnics and good citizens’. He concludes:
127
3
Colin Knox
The reason that sharing is preferable to separation and avoidance is that recent history has 128
repeatedly shown how ‘live and let live’ separatism rapidly descends into ethnic warfare in a 129
crisis as in the Balkans. (Oberschall, 2007: 237) 130
When ethnic groups have different preferences, he argues, public policy should not 131
support or subsidise these practices and institutions that make for separation, although 132
at the same time it should not ban them as long as they are voluntary and benign.
133
Taylor (2001, 2006, 2008) also advocates social transformation. In a critique of the 134
consociational arrangements synonymous with the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (Mc- 135
Garry and O’Leary, 2006) he suggests that political accommodation will regulate rather 136
than transform the conflict. He argues for micro level support to promote non-sectarian 137
initiatives within civil society that advance democracy and justice, such as integrated 138
education and housing, and criticises consociational arrangements that ‘work with and 139
solidify intracommunal networks, rather than being concerned to promote intercommunal 140
association’ (Taylor 2001: 47). Cochrane (2001, 2006) characterises social transformation 141
in Northern Ireland as a behavioural model within which the creation of better community 142
relations and cross-community reconciliation, through various means of contact, is the 143
key to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. He describes the model as follows:
144
The behavioural analysis argues that the conflict is, at its most fundamental, a product of 145
dysfunctional human relationships, a consequence of a negative stereotyping of the ‘other’
146
community and a lack of contact and communication with the ‘other’ community to break 147
down the myths and distrust that provide the fuel for the conflict. (Cochrane, 2001: 147–8) 148
Those who support the behavioural approach are more likely to emphasise the contact 149
hypothesis, communication and cross-community dialogue and the need to tackle 150
sectarianism at both the individual and group levels (Knox and Quirk, 2000; Lederach, 151
1997, 2005). At its most simple, the contact hypothesis argues that contact (under the right 152
conditions) between members of different racial or ethnic groups leads to a reduction in 153
prejudice between the groups and an increase in tolerance and mutual understanding 154
(Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1971; Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Hugheset al., 2007). The 155
alternative model is a structural perspective which holds that Northern Ireland comprises 156
two rival ideologies that are separate and represent ‘antithetical identities which cannot 157
be integrated but must be recognised and accommodated through political mechanisms 158
such as consociationalism’ (Cochrane, 2001: 151).
159
Connolly (2000) provides a useful summary of the competing theories. The contact 160
hypothesis attributes the nature and causes of ethnic division to individual ignorance and 161
misunderstanding. Sustained contact challenges pre-existing prejudices and stereotypes 162
and, over time, will translate into positive attitudes towards the ‘other’ ethnic group. This 163
ignores however the broader social processes, institutions and structures that help to create 164
and sustain ethnic tensions. Contact work is endorsed by government because it reduces 165
its role to one of encouraging cross-community contact rather than rebuilding structural 166
relations. Connolly (2000: 171) argues for a twin track approach: there is ‘certainly a 167
need to maintain a clear focus on the central role played by the broader social structures 168
and institutions, but it is also important that the more micro and interpersonal processes 169
and practice which help to sustain and reproduce racial and ethnic divisions are not 170
overlooked’.
171
4
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
McGarry (2001) rejects these social transformation approaches on the grounds that 172
their advocates see divisions in Northern Ireland as superficial and are unduly optimistic 173
about the prospects for social integration (integrated schools and housing estates) in the 174
short-term. He argues that social integration cannot take place any time soon and outside 175
the context of a political settlement, finding no evidence that the two communities want to 176
mix socially. McGarry cites the low percentage of children attending integrated schools 177
(around 6 per cent in 2007/08) as evidence of the slow pace of social transformation 178
despite being promoted since the mid 1970s and a statutory duty, from 1989, on the 179
Department of Education to ‘encourage and facilitate’ its development. In a more recent 180
quantitative study (sample size 11,500 people) of integrated education however, Hayes 181
et al. (2007: 476) found that despite the small number of children involved ‘attendance 182
at an integrated school has long-term benefits in weakening sectarian political outlooks 183
and promoting a centre and common ground in Northern Ireland politics, and this is 184
particularly the case within the Protestant community’. Ten years on from the Belfast 185
(Good Friday) Agreement however, ‘common ground’ appears elusive and segregation is 186
entrenched.
187
A particular manifestation of segregation and sectarianism occurs at interface areas 188
delineated in some cases by physical barriers (so-called ‘peace’ walls) in Northern Ireland 189
(Murtagh, 2002; Morrow, 2008). In a study of segregation in Belfast, Shirlow and Murtagh 190
(2006: 58), note that interfaces ‘both divorce and regulate intercommunity relationships, 191
and in so doing they compress space into sites that become notable places of violence 192
and resistance’. They argue that interface areas vary in form and style – some are denoted 193
by physical barriers, by flags, emblems and wall murals but all will most certainly be 194
known and understood by those who live within segregated communities. Such is the 195
pervasiveness of these barriers that it is difficult to estimate the numbers which exist.
196
Jarman (2006, 2008) claims that the term interface barrier or ‘peaceline’ is generally used 197
to refer to those barriers that have been authorised by the Northern Ireland Office in 198
response to concerns for safety and security but many other structures have been built in 199
the course of regeneration projects to separate communities. In Belfast alone he estimates 200
that there are over 80 barriers, half of which are Northern Ireland Office ‘sanctioned’
201
barriers. Jarman’s work is particularly important in the context of the case study in this 202
paper which adopted the strap line ‘A Shared Future Project in Action’, accepting the 203
principle that ‘separate but equal’ communities or ‘parallel living’ was no longer an 204
option.
205
This article adopts a conceptual position which challenges structural and behavioural 206
approaches as polar opposites when seeking to tackle systemic segregation in Northern 207
Ireland. Although McGarry and O’Leary are broadly dismissive of the ‘mix and fix’
208
mentality of social integration, they support it ‘where it is feasible and wanted’ but also 209
recognise durable divisions and the need to ensure that both groups are treated in an equal 210
manner (Bruce, 1994; McGarry and O’Leary, 1995: 856). This is consistent up to a point 211
with Taylor’s social transformation approach which involves promoting reconciliation 212
and desegregation through cross-community networks running alongside a social justice 213
agenda to tackle inequalities and injustices between the communities (Taylor, 2009). In 214
short, this article attempts to demonstrate that even in extreme circumstances, interface 215
communities, social transformation can work effectively because of the willingness of 216
groups to see a shared rather than separate future.
217
5
Colin Knox
T h e c a s e s t u d y 218
The Lenadoon Estate is a public sector housing scheme with over 9,000 residents 219
situated on the outskirts of West Belfast, on the boundary between Belfast and Lisburn 220
City Councils. The estate was built during the mid 1960s just before the outbreak of 221
‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Housing tenure was originally mixed religion, but, 222
as civil unrest spread, the nature and development of the estate suffered significantly 223
from population shift. A largely Protestant population living in the lower part of the 224
estate (Lenadoon Avenue and Horn Drive) moved out during the early 1970s and their 225
homes were filled with Catholics fleeing sectarian strife from other parts of Belfast. These 226
population shifts created a fragmented community with a common adversary – sectarian 227
violence. A Lenadoon community worker described the evolving situation thus:
228
As a result of the conflict many local people were killed and scores more injured in incidents 229
in the area. Hundreds of local people were imprisoned and this placed a heavy burden on the 230
community. . .Despite this adversity, people showed a strong attachment to the area and a 231
determination to work collectively to improve the estate and challenge the neglect of successive 232
governments and statutory bodies. (Lenadoon Community Forum, 2003: 5) 233
As Lenadoon became the refuge of Catholics from other parts of Belfast, Protestant 234
families living on the estate were forced to either move out because of sectarianism 235
and intimidation or shift to the Suffolk estate (at the lower end of Lenadoon and the 236
south side of the Stewartstown Road), which became an enclave for Protestants living 237
in West Belfast. As Catholic families grew on the Lenadoon estate, Suffolk became the 238
repository for Protestants who had chosen to remain – in effect a small commune of public 239
houses with around 1,000 people surrounded on all sides by their Catholics neighbours.
240
This managed ‘security solution’ in the early 1970s created an interface area between 241
Lenadoon and Suffolk estates (the boundary of which is Stewartstown Road) which endures 242
to the present day – euphemistically known as ‘the peace line’.
243
One Lenadoon resident at the time described it thus:
244
By 1976–7, most Protestant residents in Lenadoon had moved across the Stewartstown Road 245
into Suffolk, while their houses had been resettled by Catholic families burnt or intimidated out 246
of other parts of Belfast. And that’s when the Road became the permanent interface, the peace 247
line. And for most Catholics this road had become somewhere you didn’t cross, if you could 248
avoid. (Hall, 2007: 12) 249
Both Suffolk and Lenadoon estates suffer from significant economic disadvantage. They 250
are part of the Outer West Belfast Neighbourhood Renewal area, defined as the top 251
10 per cent of deprived neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland.1The key statistics for Outer 252
West Belfast compared with Northern Ireland in general are shown in Table 1.
253
Community development groups evolved in both areas to tackle social disadvantage 254
and became affiliated to their respective umbrella groups. Lenadoon Community Forum 255
was established in 1992 to co-ordinate the community development needs of some 20 256
member groups on the estate. Suffolk Community Forum was set up in 1994 ‘to work 257
towards creating a stable, secure and confident community in Suffolk’ (Insight Consulting, 258
2006: 3). Both forums subsequently moved to co-operate. The spirit of the early joint 259
6
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
Table 1 Outer West Belfast – key statistics2
Percentage comparisons
Outer West Belfast Neighbourhood
Renewal area (%) Northern Ireland (%)
Under 16 years of age 29.8 23.6
16–59 years of age 59.1 58.8
Over 60 years of age 11.1 17.6
Lone parent households with dependent children
19.8 8.1
General health – not good 15.1 10.7
Degree level or higher qualifications 8.9 15.8
Economically inactive 45.4 37.7
Unemployed 9.2 4.1
Rented households 47.3 30.4
meetings in 1995/96 was to discuss ‘things we think we have in common, the difficulties 260
between us and how we can be better neighbours’ (O’Halloran and McIntyre, 1999: 5).
261
From these early informal meetings, as trust developed, a formally constituted Suffolk 262
and Lenadoon Interface Group (SLIG) was established in 1999. An important aspect of 263
building trust was recognition by SLIG that both communities faced common problems.
264
The British Government reduced and eventually closed community employment schemes 265
(ACE projects) on both sides of the interface; poverty presented itself as a real issue for 266
the two estates; and protocols were established to deal with issues (parades, interface 267
violence) during periods of heightened tensions.
268
The journey towards greater co-operation between Suffolk and Lenadoon 269
encountered a number of setbacks. Wider political problems (the Drumcree parades, the 270
deaths of the Quinn children in Ballymoney) played out in the form of community interface 271
violence within Suffolk and Lenadoon. There were ongoing problems over disputed land 272
and territory. Catholics in Lenadoon point to an increasing need for social housing and 273
vacant publicly owned land available in Suffolk. Residents in Suffolk however perceive 274
this as ‘their land’ which should only be used to enhance housing or community facilities 275
for Protestants. Community activists involved in SLIG also risked a backlash from within 276
their own communities for moving at a pace on shared working inconsistent with the 277
wishes of the majority of people living in both areas. In an attempt to summarise the 278
evolution of SLIG, researchers involved in interface work in Belfast noted two key points.
279
First, although violence subsided in areas such as West Belfast (and Northern Ireland 280
more generally), this was not tantamount to ‘peace’, rather it emphasised the significant 281
amount of work to be done within communities coming out of years of conflict. Second, 282
joint development that results in real and meaningful inter-community work can be a 283
‘very slow and frustrating process’ (O’Halloran and McIntyre, 1999: 27).
284
The International Fund for Ireland funded an initial project in 2001 under the auspices 285
of SLIG for youth and community work in both areas for a three-year period. The project, 286
specifically aimed at conflict management, was conceived as a diversionary programme 287
on a single identity/community basis which sought to draw young people away from 288
the interface and direct their energies into activities. The work was crucially important 289
in terms of reducing interface tension and violence. The International Fund for Ireland 290
7
Colin Knox
reinvested for an additional three-year period which enabled SLIG to employ staff and 291
implement cross-community activities. At the same time, a regeneration project on the 292
peace line (Stewartstown Road) was initiated by the Suffolk Community Group which 293
identified a semi-derelict building owned by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive as 294
the basis for a joint project. SLIG jointly applied for funding to create a shared space on 295
the site and developed a mixed use building of 1,000m2with retail, office and community 296
space. Such was the success of this venue that a second phase has just been completed, 297
including a modern childcare facility attracting parents and toddlers from Suffolk and 298
Lenadoon estates. The residents attribute little of this to support from government in 299
Northern Ireland. As one Lenadoon resident put it:
300
The civil service gave us no amount of hassle, putting us through endless hoops and obstacles.
301
They openly called our initiative a ‘white elephant’, questioned what was in it for Lenadoon, 302
or Suffolk, and passed the opinion that it wouldn’t be used, it would just stand idle. . . I 303
remember after we had applied for further funding to develop the project into its second phase, 304
a representative from the Belfast Regeneration Office said at a meeting: ‘you’ve cured the 305
interface, so why would you need more funding?’ As if it was some sort of disease to be ‘cured’!
306
(cited in Hall, 2007: 28) 307
In January 2007, as a direct result of ongoing collaborative work, SLIG attracted a major 308
investment of £2m over three years from Atlantic Philanthropies3for the implementation 309
of a (joint) SLIG peace-building plan to support community-based reconciliation through 310
the promotion of shared services, facilities and public spaces. Specifically the joint plan 311
comprises four key strands:
312
(a) Peace-building activities: these include shared pre-school provision, transformation 313
of the controlled (Protestant) Suffolk Primary School into an integrated school, a 314
health and women’s development project, cultural initiative, youth activities and sports 315
development schemes.
316
(b) Joint advocacy: lobbying government agencies on a joint community basis to address 317
the social and economic needs of Suffolk and Lenadoon and the legacy of the conflict.
318
(c) Building capacity for peace building: through community leadership and widening 319
and deepening the basis of community self-help beyond the established activists which 320
constitute the respective community forums.
321
(d) Developing shared space: by targeting derelict land and premises which could be 322
reclaimed or refurbished as joint community facilities owned and managed by local 323
people from the two communities.
324
An important element of the project was to undertake a probability survey of residents in 325
the Suffolk and Lenadoon areas after a two-year period to assess the effectiveness of this 326
grassroots initiative. SLIG commissioned a reputable market survey company (Millward 327
Brown) to conduct the fieldwork and the data set was made available to the author 328
for further analysis beyond reported descriptive statistics. A random location sampling 329
technique was used to ensure that every resident in the specified areas of Suffolk and 330
Lenadoon (those streets closest to the interface) was given an equal chance to participate.
331
In addition, the sample was quota controlled by age to reflect the population of the 332
area. In total 400 questionnaires were completed in November 2008 using a face-to-face 333
methodology (Millward Brown, 2008). Weightings were applied to the sample to ensure 334
8
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
Figure 1. Have you supported peace-building work?
that it would reflect the proportion of households in the Suffolk and Lenadoon areas. This 335
produced a sample size of 116 from the Suffolk area and 284 from the Lenadoon area.
336
T h e fi n d i n g s 337
Has this community-based bottom–up initiative proved successful and does it offer the 338
potential for a wider civil society model in Northern Ireland peace building? We consider 339
two key questions arising from the empirical work as a means of understanding support 340
for, and early reactions to, peace-building work in two polarised and highly segmented 341
communities suffering from a protracted period of political conflict. Residents were asked:
342
1. Have you supported peace-building work between the Suffolk and Lenadoon 343
communities?
344
2. Do you think that the peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon has been 345
effective?
346
The obviously corollary to these questions iswhyresidents in the two communities thought 347
peace-building work had been effective or ineffective. This question was not asked in the 348
survey on the basis that it demanded more detailed qualitative responses (perhaps using 349
focus groups) or at the very least an open-ended question which, from experience, tends 350
to result in a superficial or non response. Indirectly, by examining those factors which 351
influence or predict respondents’ support for, and perceptions of, effective peace building, 352
we attempt to interrogate their opinions further.
353
Considering the first question, the results indicate that there is a greater level of support 354
for peace building from Catholic/Lenadoon residents than their Protestant counterparts 355
in Suffolk, although overall support for cross-community work comes from almost 356
90 per cent of respondents in the survey (see Figure 1). The chi-square tests suggest 357
that there is a significant difference (p<0.05) between Suffolk and Lenadoon in their 358
support for peace-building work (see Table 2). That said, it is important to acknowledge 359
the overwhelming support in both communities for peace building at 95.2 per cent and 360
82.6 per cent in Lenadoon and Suffolk, respectively. This clearly demonstrates the appetite 361
for cross-community work in an area previously synonymous with violent conflict.
362
9
Colin Knox
Table 2 Chi-square tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Pearson chi-square 20.160 2 0.000
Likelihood ratio 20.961 2 0.000 Linear-by-linear Association 10.659 1 0.001 Nof valid cases 400
Figure 2.Has peace-building work been effective?
Table 3 Chi-square tests
Value df Asymp. sig. (2-sided) Pearson chi-square 21.557 2 0.000
Likelihood ratio 22.222 2 0.000 Linear-by-linear Association 20.744 1 0.000 Nof valid cases 400
In response to the second question, the results show that despite Lenadoon (Catholic) 363
residents overwhelmingly supporting peace-building work, less than half of them 364
(44.5 per cent) considered it to be effective (see Figure 2). Although a lower percentage 365
of Suffolk residents supported peace building, almost two-thirds (64.5 per cent) felt that 366
it was effective. Overall, just over half the respondents (53.1 per cent) considered cross- 367
community peace-building work to be effective with almost one-third (32.7 per cent) 368
undecided. The chi-square tests suggest a significant difference (p<0.05) between the 369
views of Lenadoon and Suffolk residents on whether they feel peace building has been 370
effective (see Table 3).
371
To further understand which factors influence/predict the different views of Lenadoon 372
and Suffolk residents towards peace building we conducted logistic regressions. We were 373
interested in finding out which variables predict the likelihood of (a) residents supporting 374
peace building and (b) whether they see peace-building efforts as effective, respectively?
375
In terms of the former the categorical dependent variable and predictor variables are as 376
follows:
377
10
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
Have you supported peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon 378
communities?
379
Categorical dependent variable:
380
Support: Have you supported peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon?
381
(yes/no) 382
Predictor variables:
383
Gender: Gender of respondent (male/female) 384
Age: Age of respondent (in years) 385
Reside: Are you a Suffolk or Lenadoon resident? (Suffolk/Lenadoon) 386
Friends: Do you have any friends from the ‘other community’? (yes/no) 387
Vabuse: Have you ever been verbally abused by a member from the ‘other 388
community’ close to the interface area? (yes/no) 389
Pabuse: Have you ever been physically abused by a member from the ‘other 390
community’ close to the interface area? (yes/no) 391
The results are set out in Table 4.
392
Table 4 Have you supported peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon?
Variables in the equation
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig.
Age –0.981 0.475 4.272 1 0.039
Vabuse –2.021 0.582 12.072 1 0.001
Friends 0.935 0.654 2.044 1 0.153
Pabuse 0.449 0.624 0.518 1 0.472
Gender 19.022 8707.265 0.000 1 0.998
Reside 0.000 0.013 0.001 1 0.982
Constant 4.161 0.801 27.010 1 0.000
Omnibus tests of model coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 38.109 6 0.000
Block 38.109 6 0.000
Model 38.109 6 0.000
Hosmer and Lemeshow test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 0.663 6 0.995
Model summary Step −2 Log
likelihood
Cox and Snell R Square
Nagelkerke R Square
1 38.573(a) 0.101 0.524
11
Colin Knox
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a highly significant value (p<0.0005) 393
and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test supports the conclusion that the model is a good 394
fit (chi square value of 0.663 and p>0.05). The model summary statistics indicate that 395
between 10.1 per cent and 52.4 per cent of the variability in the dependent variable is 396
explained by this set of predictor variables. The Wald test shows that the two variables 397
that contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model (significance<0.05) 398
are the age of the respondent (p=0.039) and whether they have suffered verbal abuse by 399
a member of the other community at the interface area (p=0.001). The results suggest 400
that younger people (16–25 age group) and those who have suffered verbal abuse at the 401
interface areless likelyto support cross-community peace-building work.
402
Turning to the second question:
403
Do you think that this peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon has been 404
effective?
405
Categorical dependent variable:
406
Effective: Do you think that the peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon 407
has been effective? (yes/no) 408
Predictor variables:
409
Gender: Gender of respondent (male/female) 410
Age: Age of respondent (in years) 411
Reside: Are you a Suffolk or Lenadoon resident? (Suffolk/Lenadoon) 412
Friends: Do you have any friends from the ‘other community’? (yes/no) 413
Vabuse: Have you ever been verbally abused by a member from the ‘other 414
community’ close to the interface area? (yes/no) 415
Pabuse: Have you ever been physically abused by a member from the ‘other 416
community’ close to the interface area? (yes/no) 417
The results are set out in Table 5.
418
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a highly significant value (p<0.0005) 419
and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test supports the conclusion that the model is a good 420
fit (chi square value of 3.420 and p>0.05). The model summary statistics indicate that 421
between 12.8 per cent and 21 per cent of the variability in the dependent variable is 422
explained by this set of predictor variables. The Wald test shows that the three variables 423
which contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model (significance<0.05) 424
are: the age of the respondent (p=0.002); whether they have suffered verbal abuse by a 425
member of the other community at the interface area (p=0.003); and whether they come 426
from Suffolk or Lenadoon (p=0.004). The results suggest that younger people (16–25 age 427
group) and those who have suffered verbal abuse at the interface areless likelyto think 428
that peace-building work has been effective, and residents from Suffolk aremore likelyto 429
see its effectiveness.
430
These survey results are clearly located in the behavioural cross-community contact 431
literature, testing interaction across the community divide, and devoid of a structural 432
overlay in the form of public policies to address segregation. Having adopted the mantra 433
of ‘A Shared Future Project in Action’, Suffolk and Lenadoon communities felt abandoned 434
by local politicians who eschewed this policy framework. There is a real sense that 435
12
Peace Building in Northern Ireland
Table 5 Do you think that the peace-building work between Suffolk and Lenadoon has been effective?
Variables in the equation
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig.
Age 0.039 0.013 9.611 1 0.002
Vabuse –1.234 0.416 8.808 1 0.003
Friends 0.402 0.411 0.955 1 0.328
Pabuse –0.060 0.668 0.008 1 0.928
Gender –0.405 0.371 1.192 1 0.275
Reside 1.159 0.403 8.289 1 0.004
Constant –0.087 0.566 0.023 1 0.878
Omnibus tests of model coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 34.369 6 0.000
Block 34.369 6 0.000
Model 34.369 6 0.000
Hosmer and Lemeshow test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 3.420 8 0.905
Model summary Step –2 Log likelihood Cox and Snell
R square
Nagelkerke R Square
1 201.724 0.128 0.210
macro political ‘solutions’ have yet to deliver social, economic and reconciliation gains 436
at grassroots level and Suffolk and Lenadoon see their destiny in their own hands. In this 437
policy vacuum, communities appear to be ahead of their politicians and some are taking 438
control of, and shaping, their own shared future.
439
C o n c l u s i o n s 440
This empirical case study has attempted to understand the dynamics of cross-community 441
interaction and contact at the most acute level of segregation in Northern Ireland – an 442
interface area in West Belfast. In so doing, it has responded to the challenge posed 443
by Shirlow and Murtagh (2006: 172) that ‘there is a general failing within academic 444
analysis with regard to misunderstanding the role and designation of peace builders.
445
It is usually assumed that the educated and “rational” will play a significant role in 446
conflict alteration.’ Our findings offer an insight into the response of community groups 447
and interface residents (as opposed to outside agencies) to a joint peace-building plan 448
funded by a philanthropic benefactor. The case study provides a micro analysis of the 449
social transformation process between two polar communities, embittered by the legacy 450
13
Colin Knox
of sectarianism, and interrogates the effectiveness of activities aimed at peace building.
451
What is significant in the findings is that although the majority community in the case 452
study (Catholic Lenadoon) is more supportive of the peace-building work, it is the minority 453
community (Protestant Suffolk) which sees the activities as more effective. Key variables 454
which predict these responses are young people who suffer verbal abuse at interface 455
areas. Those in the age group 16–25 who have suffered verbal abuse at the interface are 456
less likely to support peace-building work and see its effectiveness. This poses specific 457
challenges for future work within highly segregated communities.
458
In conclusion, the empirical results of this case study of Suffolk and Lenadoon, 459
an extreme example of segregation, would support the need for social transformation 460
initiatives involving civil society, set alongside progress at the macro political level. This 461
micro analysis provides evidence of the success of social transformation in a public policy 462
vacuum, but also highlights the need for local politicians to embrace a broader social 463
justice agenda to reinforce the expressed wishes of communities to share rather than 464
consolidate separation. Consociationalism and social transformation are not mutually 465
exclusive but rather jointly supportive. There are some encouraging signs of connection.
466
DUP Minister of Finance and party stalwart, Sammy Wilson, recently visited a cross- 467
community interface project in North Belfast (Alexandra Park) and commented that 468
‘people are challenging some of the root causes of sectarianism and in doing so improving 469
the quality of life for themselves and future generations’ (Wilson, 2009: 2). This comment 470
is from a minister in the devolved power-sharing Executive who recognises the work of 471
cross-community groups at local level.
472
A key variable in the success of inter-community work is the involvement of young 473
people and the quality of contact between them. This study also challenges the assumption 474
that Protestant interface residents are ‘lukewarm’ on the effectiveness of peace-building 475
work. The Northern Ireland Executive is currently considering a replacement policy forA 476
Shared Futurein which it aims to increase investment over the next three years to promote 477
cohesion, sharing and integration from £21.7m currently to £28.7m (Office of the First 478
Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2008). Thus far, there has been a reluctance by the 479
two main power-sharing parties (DUP and Sinn F´ein) to prioritise social transformation, 480
presumably because it could weaken the sectarian bases from which they draw their 481
own political support – indeed the two largest parties have issued separate draft versions 482
of the proposed policy onCohesion, Sharing and Integration. More recently there was 483
a partisan response to reviving the Civic Forum (representing business, trade union and 484
voluntary sectors) which was originally set up under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 485
as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues but was mothballed 486
during the suspension of devolution. With adequate resources and jointly agreed peace- 487
building goals, the Suffolk and Lenadoon communities have shown that they are capable 488
of managing their own preferred destiny towards a more cohesive, integrated and shared 489
society. Civil society in Northern Ireland can play a key role in bottom–up peace building 490
by tackling the worst excesses of a deeply segregated society in a post-conflict era.
491
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s 492
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable inputs provided by members of the Suffolk 493
and Lenadoon Interface Group to this paper. All views expressed, errors and omissions 494
remain the responsibility of the author.
495
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Peace Building in Northern Ireland
N o t e s 496
1 There are 36 areas targeted for neighbourhood renewal across Northern Ireland (15 in Belfast; 6 497
in (London)derry; and 15 in other provincial towns and cities).
498
2 Source: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency – http://www.ninis.nisra.gov.uk 499
3 Atlantic Philanthropies is a philanthropic organization funded by American Charles Feeney which 500
aims to bring about lasting changes in the lives of disadvantaged and vulnerable people. They work on 501
four main issues – ageing, children and youth, population health, and reconciliation and human rights 502
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