The basis of the research is collections of memoirs and fieldwork data in the village of Kamenka in Northern Kazakhstan. The phenomenon of ethnicity and ethnic identity is one of the most fluid in relation to historical realities. The focus of this work is the fate of the Polish population that inhabited the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus.
Polish nobles, who mostly supported Polish patriots, controlled much of the lands on the Right Bank. And since much emphasis is placed on the ethnopolitics of the Soviet period in this work, it is necessary to define some terms. The Sovietization of Polish minorities separated two generations and left an indelible mark on the modern generation of the descendants of.
The second chapter focuses on the war and the post-Stalin periods and explores the ways in which the Polish minority was sovietized. In addition to the history of the Catholic Church in Kazakhstan, he described many local cultural features.
Transformation of the local identity: the first generations of deportees
Each village on the border had its own ethnic composition with varying proportions of Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Jews, etc. And villages were rarely combined into larger units, preferring isolation.27 However, the Soviets succeeded in "ethnifying the enemies". This chapter will discuss the essence of the ethnic identity of the Polish group and its transformation after the deportations in the 1930s.
The emphasis is on the first generation of deportees, which became the basis of ethnic identity for subsequent generations. Before examining Polish ethnic identity, we must focus on the reasons that led to the mass deportations. In addition, the rural population of the border population of Right Bank Ukraine did not receive the Bolsheviks in a friendly manner.
Molotov on Resettlement of Polish Families from the Border Areas of the Vinnytsia and Kiev Regions (October 27, 1935).36. The literature on the culture of the Polish population before the deportations is confusing and fragmented. It was the act of political efforts to reorganize the population and territories of the border countries.
2001. The Empire of Affirmative Action: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union Cornell University Press, 22. sees the basis of terror in the category-based politics of the Soviet Union which was similar to the worldview of the Nazis. If we zoom in on the map of the region, we can see many oftochka-s55 (that's how the special settlements were originally called). 1993. Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
NKVD officers forged the sign of the foreman of the kolkhoz by order of the transfer. And the behavior of the first generation of deportees was not close to humility, the cases of escapes and theft,71 but most of the resistance cases were concealed. These nationalities are known for "their prolonged rebellion against the rule of the Tsar and later the Soviet regime".
The Catholic priest, who was born in the village of Kamenka, Waclaw Poplawski (his parents were deported from the Zhytomyr region) provides a detailed history of the Catholic Church in the Akmola region. The "liminal" generation was mainly protected from the subject of deportation due to their parents' fear of the state.
Sovietization: intragroup interaction
The latter was in the interest of the authorities because the cities and the army needed the facilities. Special settlers continued to register in the commander's office, were not allowed to leave the place of residence and paid high taxes. However, there is a monument of World War II soldiers in the town square, where the interviewer's father and another 50 other people are present (see Figure 3).
Unfortunately, this video was not published in open source. . included anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin comments). The differences between two generations and features of the second generation are described in the next subsection. In the interview, a representative of the second generation (born in 1979) shared the desire to know Polish, but as his.
Young people took the opportunity to leave the village and get higher education in the nearest cities. Most of them struggle with the perception of the changes that came after the Soviet period, especially in the ethnic/national issue. The Soviet authorities formulated the policy and ideology of interethnic marriages only in the post-war and post-Stalin period. 99 Referring to the post-war period, Edgar says: "The Soviet state celebrated mixed marriages as proof of the unbreakable 'friendship of nations' and a sign of the imminent emergence of the 'Soviet people'".
For years, inter-ethnic marriages in Brezhnev were considered “a proof of progress in the consolidation of a united 'Soviet people,'” meaning the. Some of them even admit that “they cannot believe in the Christian God,” while none of the respondents consider themselves atheists. The Catholic Church has never given preference to any ethnic group, neither in the Soviet period nor in the post-Soviet period.
The tradition of religiouschudo (miracle), which was very popular in Ukraine, was spread among Kazakh Catholics in the 1950s. Another interesting point is the celebration of Farewell to Winter (analogue of Maslenitsa) in the post-Stalin era. The first was the level of risk and the likely degree of punishment, which was much higher during the Stalin period.
Soviet footprint and individualism of the descendants of deportees
Most of the first generation deported to the southern region of Kazakhstan settled with the existing Kazakh auls. In Kazakhstan, there are eleven district Polish community organizations and cultural centers concentrated around "Związek Polaków Kazachstanu" (the Union of Poles in Kazakhstan), which has a total of about four thousand members.107 The Union is part of the global phenomenon of Poland – the Polish diaspora consists of Poles and people of Polish heritage or origin living outside Poland. The Union became part of the larger company – the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan – and took over the functions of social and political representation of the Polish minority in the state.
The structure and 'philosophy' of these organizations are similar to local or central Soviet authorities such as the VLKSM or its yaks. The president and other administrations are collectively chosen and the main purpose is to "support and promote" certain values: by the Soviets. in Polish (Kazakhstan). Why does the majority of the Polish population in Kazakhstan not participate in ethnic communities? In the first years after the breakup, Russia became the focal point due to the lack of language and cultural barriers.
The current third wave of repatriation117 began with the transformation of the political system in 1989 in Poland and in 1991 - in Kazakhstan. For example, Robert Wyszyński notes that, with this category of immigrants, there is no return to their homeland in the literal sense, because it was "the homeland that left them."120 As a result of policy and changes in border settlements, repatriated Poles did not return to the lands of their ancestors, but arrive in their historical and ideological homeland. Research papers help to find out why repatriation does not suit certain groups of Poles.
Another law that allows persons of Polish origin in the territory of the former USSR or those who are stateless in these countries to come to Poland is the Polish Card (Polish Card) from 2007. One of the reasons for the existence of the second group is politics state. This is facilitated by the lack of a framework in the form of fear of the Soviets.
Also, there is a marked difference between the descendants of the deportees of the first (1930s) and second (1940s) waves of forced displacement. 2014. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union. Cornell University Press. 2002. The Weight of the Past: Living with History in Mahajanga, Madagascar. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 211.
The persecution of ethnic Germans in the USSR during World War II. The Russian Review. 1993. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 200 p.
